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William Paley's The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy is one of the most influential 
modern works of theological utilitarianism. His views on moral philosophy, evidentialism and 
natural theology were required reading in English universities up until the 1850s. It is the purpose 
of this thesis to argue that Paley believed his moral philosophy to be a science that operated 
according to logical principles. Chapter 1 outlines the intellectual environment, religious context 
and secondary literature about Paley’s moral philosophy. Chapter 2 avers that Paley used Scripture 
and personal experience as evidence for providing a rational basis for moral knowledge. Focusing 
on the notion of moral law, Chapter 3 discusses the innovative principles of happiness and 
expediency through which Paley created a criterion of conduct that was grounded on rational 
evidence. Last but not least, since the Principles was a textbook in the Cambridge syllabus, Chapter 
4, argues that Paley adopted a more accessible synthetic method of argumentation for educational 
purposes. The conclusion explains how the thesis’s argument extends and challenges current 
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“First accumulate a mass of Facts: and then construct a Theory.” 
That, I believe, is the true Scientific Method. 


















Chapter 1  
The Intellectual Context of William Paley 
 
Introduction 
During the period between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, William 
Paley's The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy was probably the most famous and 
influential work about theological utilitarianism. Paley is best known as an outstanding Christian 
apologist, however, he was highly praised as a moralist as well in that period. After its first 
publication in 1785, the Principles almost immediately became a textbook in the Cambridge 
syllabus, and remained so for many years. In other words, Paley’s Principles formed the 
cornerstone of the Cambridge curriculum. Twenty-one editions, including fifteen editions during 
Paley’s lifetime demonstrate that the Principles not only established the author’s reputation, but 
also was a widely-read book even after Paley’s death. Historians honor this book because of its 
vital contribution to eighteenth-century English ethics and its possible influence on American 
Christianity today. As such an influential book, it is definitely worthy of further attention.  
After explaining the intellectual context of Paley’s moral philosophy in Chapter 1, this thesis 
is divided into three parts to argue that his moral philosophy was an eighteenth-century 
probabilistic form of science. Chapter 2 explains that Paley regarded scriptural testimony and 
personal experience as credible evidence in the Principles. According to the eighteenth-century 
definition of science, moral decision-making was based on the high probabilities derived from 
credible evidence. In other words, one of Paley’s goals in the Principles was to address the question, 
what kinds of rational evidence were needed to support his theological utilitarianism. 
In Chapter 3, I argue that Paley endeavored to establish the principle of expediency in the 
Principles to compensate for the deficiencies of the moral theories of his time. In the spheres of 
moral and natural philosophy, divinely imposed principles replaced the inherent virtues of 
humankind and natural things in Paley’s day. If divinely authored principles of nature would replace 
the inner qualities of natural things, just like what Newton sought to find in his Principia, then 
divinely authored moral principles would also replace human virtues. Based on rational evidence, 
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Paley devoted himself to finding the principle of expediency with a serious theological 
consideration.  
Chapter 4 expounds Paley’s view on synthetic logic in the Principles. It should not be 
forgotten that his Principles was expanded from lecture notes at Cambridge and was applied as a 
university textbook. As knowledge was no longer exclusive to the realm of syllogistic demonstration, 
Paley felt it necessary to find another form of logic which was suitable for a more probable form of 
knowledge. In order to respond to those who judged that the Principles was just a synthesis of the 
researches of Paley’s predecessors, this chapter avers that Paley showed an aversion to syllogism 
and gave praise to a synthetic pedagogics in the Principles.  
To achieve this goal, I adopt an approach which is both textual and contextual. This thesis 
mainly focuses on the arguments offered in Paley’s The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy 
(1785), but it also draws from his A View of the Evidences on Christianity (1794), and Natural 
Theology (1802). Paley’s Cambridge years as an undergraduate and as a lecturer played a decisive 
role in the formation of Paley’s his thinking of moral and religious issues. This experience offered 
Paley access to the major ethical, political and metaphysical learning circles in his time. Additionally, 
he formed his method and style of argumentation and pedagogics which he later developed and 
used in his works including the Principles. Last but not least, during his Cambridge years, Paley’s 
mind became more and more complete and mature than the thoughts of his youth in the North 
Country.1 It is worth noting that, in spite of the fact that moral and political philosophy were often 
combined in Paley’s day, it does not lie within the scope of this thesis to treat his views on politics 
except as they affect his ethics. For this reason, this thesis leaves it to future historians to discuss 
Paley’s views on the large-scale changes occurring in social, economic, or political arenas. This 
thesis links Paley’s arguments about moral science with the special Cambridge intellectual context 
which developed his thoughts and which then contributed to his theological utilitarianism 
throughout his career. Above all, this thesis follows a contextual and textual method to mainly 
focus on Paley’s Principles along with other early modern thinkers’ works. 
As every chapter of this thesis unfolds, it will become more apparent that Paley employed 
a body of standard eighteenth-century moral philosophical knowledge that was the combination 
 
1 D. L. LeMahieu, The Mind of William Paley (London: The University of Nebraska, 1976), 20. 
3 
 
of the principle of expediency with the teachings of Scripture. From a modern perspective, Paley’s 
moral philosophy looks like a mixture of the physical science, ethical edification, and theological 
piety about a benevolent Creator. This mixed product was the natural outcome of the presumed 
unity of knowledge based on the only omnipotent God. As a result, Paley investigated evidence 
continually, tended to build on a general principle which could be applied widely, and aspired to 
establish a system of moral knowledge which could be the most probable one. Upon the whole, 
Paley’s Principles deserves to be discussed as a noteworthy representative of eighteenth-century 
ethics. 
 
1. Paley’s Intellectual Context  
My understanding of Paley’s intellectual context is mainly influenced by Barbara J. Shapiro’s 
Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England.2 For scholars who live today, “science” 
and “morality” fall into two distinct domains. The former refers to the disciplined inquiry into the 
nature and operations of the physical world while the latter is about the goals and values of human 
existence. Science is linked with disparate disciplines and institutions, specific professions and 
personnel who are called scientists. 3  However, these understandings are relatively recent 
conceptions, developed after the professionalization of science in the nineteenth century, which 
had no coherent counterpart in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Science used to be 
conceived of a body of knowledge. The Latin term scientia was used to refer to a body of 
demonstrative knowledge.4 Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston define the medieval Latin scientia 
and its cognate modern English science as “any rigorous and certain body of knowledge that could 
be organized (in precept though not always in practice) in the form of syllogistic demonstrations 
from self-evident premises”.5  Science was always related to “certainty”, “demonstration” and 
 
2 Barbara J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1983). 
3 “Introduction: The Age of the New”, in The Cambridge History of Science, Volume III: Early Modern Science, eds. 
K. Park and L. Daston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2-3. For a good general account of the modern 
category and change of science, see Peter Harrison, “Professing Science”, in The Territories of Science and Religion 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago, 2015), Chapter 6, 159-182: “Modern science, then, emerges from a threefold 
process: first, a new identity—the scientist—is forged for its practitioners; second, it is claimed that the sciences 
share a distinctive method, one that excludes reference to religious and moral considerations; and, third, following 
on from this, the character of this new science is consolidated by drawing sharp boundaries and positing the 
existence of contrast cases—science and pseudo-science, science and technology, science and the humanities and, 
most important for our purposes, science and religion”. 
4 Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 20. 
5 The Cambridge History of Science, vol. 3 (2006), 3. 
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“syllogism”. Knowledge was both distinct from and better than opinion which was related to 
“probability”, “evidence”, “induction”. The first edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1771) 
testifies that “science, in philosophy, denotes any doctrine, deduced from self-evident and certain 
principles, by a regular demonstration”.6 It can be seen that this division had lasted at least until 
the end of the eighteenth century. 
However, Shapiro’s book avers that this centuries-old division of knowledge and opinion 
had eroded since the seventeenth century. 7  Knowledge was not merely reserved for the 
demonstrative products of syllogistic logic. There was another form of knowledge relating to a 
reasonable calculation of the high probabilities based on credible evidence.8 The reshaping of 
science prompted English speaking intellectuals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to 
rethink the nature of knowledge. In his recent book, Utilitarianism in the Age of Enlightenment, 
Niall O’Flaherty explains that “moral philosophy was similarly conceived of, in the majority of cases, 
as a scientific (i.e. evidence-based) enterprise serving theological purpose”.9 This explanation 
reveals that science was still used to refer to systematic knowledge in the eighteenth century while 
the ancient division of demonstrative knowledge and probable opinion gradually faded. The 
understanding of knowledge during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not only 
considered as the form of a deductive structure derived from unquestionable premises, but also 
as highly probable knowledge beyond reasonable doubt. In this connection, I must firstly state that 
when I use words “science” and “scientific” in this thesis, I do not confine it to a narrow category 
of professional science. 
Since knowledge had been released from the realm of logical demonstration, it began to 
take on empirical and practical meaning. 10  Stephen Gaukroger points out that there was an 
emergence of human science from the eighteenth to the middle of nineteenth centuries, which 
was a novel programme relating to human understanding and actions based on scientific 
principles.11 Although “the Sciences of man will not admit of the same accuracy which several 
 
6 Encyclopaedia Britannica (Edinburgh 1771), 3 vols., s. v. “Science” (III. 570a). 
7 Shapiro (1983), 3. 
8 Shapiro (1983), Introduction. 
9 Niall O’Flaherty, Utilitarianism in the Age of Enlightenment: The Moral and Political Thought of William Paley 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 8. 
10 Shapiro (1983), 19. 
11 Stephen Gaukroger, The Nature and the Human: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1739-1841 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), 1. 
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parts of natural philosophy are found susceptible of”, David Hume’s desire to be “the Newton of 
the moral Sciences” embodies a huge number of eighteenth-century intellectuals’ search for a 
viable science of human.12 That is to say, the eighteenth-century definition of science implies a 
tendency to build on a set of general principles as standards of human conduct. Just as stated in 
his letter to Richard Bentley, Isaac Newton’s Principia (1687) kept “an eye on such principles as 
might work with considering men, for the belief of a Deity”.13 Moralists applied themselves to the 
exploration of a systematic knowledge of moral philosophy grounded on reasonable evidence and 
general principles in Paley’s day. In other words, the question turns to what kinds of evidence 
would be necessary to yield moral principles, and to what degree such principles would be credible, 
and how a reasonable person would be convinced. Thus, the Principles serves as the perfect case 
to research the subject of the early modern rethinking of science. It is the purpose of this thesis to 
argue that Paley’s moral philosophy was a science which put forward general principles of 
happiness and expediency based on rational scriptural and experiential evidence by synthetic logic.  
As almost all of Paley’s works were developed from his lectures given at Cambridge, it is 
worth discussing how his works were shaped by the intellectual atmosphere there. D. L. LeMahieu 
summarizes two characteristics of philosophy of “Paley and his school”. One was the “unity of 
design”. This implied a theological argument that the universe revealed itself to be the work of one 
only omniscient God. The other was theological utilitarianism. 14  As O’Flaherty has shown, 
theological utilitarianism was the mainstream of moral philosophy at eighteenth-century 
Cambridge advocated by John Gay and Edmund Law in the early eighteenth century. It boomed 
under Abraham Tucker in the mid-eighteenth century, and peaked in the later part of the century.15 
For most educated people, the nature and operations of the physical universe and the moral values 
and goals of human existence were seen as overlapping.  
The notion of the “argument from design” provided a vital unifying theme for natural and 
moral philosophy from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the middle of the nineteenth. 
 
12 David Hume, An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature, A 1, SBN 645-6, < https://davidhume.org/texts/a/>. 
Richard Olson’s “The Human Sciences”, The Cambridge History of Science, Volume IV: Eighteenth-Century Science, 
ed. Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 436-462. 
13 Isaac Newton to Richard Bentley, 10 December 1692, The Work of Richard Bentley D.D, ed. Alexander Dyce, 3 
vols. (London, 1838), vol. 3, 203. 
14 LeMahieu (1976), 15. 
15 O’Flaherty (2019), 2. 
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Natural theology provided a strong religious significance by exhibiting the mind of God and his 
Creation. 16  In the celebrated General Scholium appended to the 1715 edition of Newton’s 
Principia, he declared that “this most elegant system of the sun, planets, and comets could not 
have arisen without the design and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being.”17 For Newton, 
God “is certainly part of natural philosophy”.18 The precise revolutions of celestial bodies and 
intricate mechanisms of plant and animal anatomy were increasingly regarded as evidence of 
divine contrivance.  
The eighteenth-century Cambridge curriculum that adopted Newtonian natural philosophy 
reflected that this unity of theological and physical truths went up to an institutional level.19 
During Paley’s academic career, scholastic philosophy was disappearing from the Cambridge 
curriculum and was gradually replacing by the theories of Newton, Rene Descartes, Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz, Joseph Butler, and John Locke. In Advice to a Young Student with a Method of 
Study for the Four First Years (1740), Daniel Waterland advised the first-year students to study 
Newtonian elementary arithmetic and geometry with the supplement of the works of Samuel 
Clarke, John Keill and William Whiston, and further to study Newton’s Opticks in their fourth year.20  
Like the Cambridge syllabus, the works of Locke and Butler, Clarke’s Boyle Lectures (1704–
1705), John Wilkins’s Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (1675), George Cheyne’s 
Philosophical Principles of Religion (1715), and Robert Jenkin’s Reasonableness and Certainty of the 
Christian Religion (1700) were read at Oxford throughout the eighteenth century as well.21 Just as 
Peter Harrison concludes, there was a common intellectual context until the mid-nineteenth 
century, which was “the idea of contrivance or design, along with the concept of divinely imposed 
and universal laws of nature”.22 Newtonian natural philosophy begun to gain a foothold and came 
to dominate the curriculum since the late seventeenth century. 
On the other hand, Christianity was thought of as the supplement of natural theology in 
 
16 Harrison (2015), 148-149. 
17 Isaac Newton, The Principia, trans. I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1999), 940. 
18 Newton (1999), 943. 
19 O’Flaherty (2019), 7. 
20 Daniel Waterland, Advice to A Young Student with A Method of Study for the Four First Years (Cambridge, 1740), 
18, 27. 
21 Harrison (2015), 149-150. 
22 Harrison (2015), 149-153. 
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this period. Locke’s rejection of the notion of innate ideas and emphasis on the importance of 
experience and reason were congenial to many of the Cambridge latitudinarians who were the 
proponents of rational religion with a concern for morality and ethics, and offered a critical 
contribution to the formation of Paley’s thoughts about morality and religion. For the second-year 
students at Cambridge, Waterland highlighted Locke’s An Essay on the Human Understanding 
(1689). 23  Under the influence of Lockean epistemology, Cambridge latitudinarians sought to 
provide the rational foundations of Christianity on the premise of the limitations of reason. They 
considered scriptural and experiential evidence as reliable sources of knowledge, and thus they 
were comfortable with a probable level of this kind of knowledge.  
Such attitudes manifest that, for Cambridge latitudinarians, knowledge reasoned from 
God’s contrivances and revealed religion were seen as reciprocally reinforcing in the same 
theological framework. 24  For example, although Edmund Law denied that Christianity was 
universally necessary, his desire to reconcile Christianity to scientific views led him to adopt the 
evidence of miracles, which was characteristic of Paley’s school.25  Natural theology provided 
reasonable criteria for judging the credibility of scriptural declarations while revealed religion was 
seen as a tool of revealing divine operations in the light of nature. Above all, Cambridge 
latitudinarians saw natural theology as being in harmony with revealed religion.26 
 
2. Paley’s Intellectual Orientation 
Paley was deeply influenced by Newtonian natural philosophy and Lockean epistemology 
at Cambridge. As LeMahieu points out, Paley’s Cambridge years had a profound or even decisive 
influence on his mind to build up a systematic philosophy.27 Paley was born at Peterborough in 
Yorkshire July of 1743. Before entering Cambridge, he was educated under his father, William Paley 
who was known as a classical school-master. At the age of fifteen, Paley was admitted to Christ’s 
College at Cambridge where he demonstrated his talent in mathematics as an undergraduate, and 
 
23 Waterland (1740), 22. 
24 O’Flaherty (2019), 7. 
25 Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 2 vols. (London: Smith, Elder, & CO., 15 
Waterloo Place, 1876), vol. 1, 407. 
26 O’Flaherty (2019), 13. 
27 LeMahieu (1976), 20. 
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then lectured classes of moral philosophy and theology.28 Because Paley was good at mathematics, 
he was excused from attending Anthony Shepherd’s lectures on algebra, geometry and natural 
philosophy. At the same time, Paley attended William Backhouse’s lectures on logic, metaphysics 
and moral philosophy.29 As to the Cambridge curriculum, M. L. Clarke points out that subjects at 
Cambridge mainly followed the theories of the Newtonian and Lockean, and concentrated on 
mathematics, natural philosophy, metaphysics and moral philosophy.30 
Paley’s close acquaintance with Cambridge latitudinarians involved himself in the reform of 
both the university and the Church, which played a critical role in the formation of his thoughts 
about morality and religion. The current ideological trend at Cambridge was increasingly 
concerned with the reliability of transcendental doctrines of revealed theology.31 The master of 
Peterhouse, Edmund Law was one of the prime advocates of the reform to relieve the clergy from 
mandatory subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles in the university.32 Later in life, Paley was lavish 
in his praise for Law’s efforts to render religion more rational and credible in the dedicatory preface 
to the Principles.33  
No doubt sensitive to this reform, Paley was promoted to be a lecturer by Law and gained 
a prestigious and influential reputation at Cambridge. On June 24th 1766, Paley was elected as a 
fellow at Christ’s College, and in 1768 was selected with John Law, the son of Edmund Law, as an 
assistant to Shepard.34  Paley lectured on metaphysics, moral philosophy and the Greek New 
Testament, while Law lectured on mathematics and natural philosophy.35 William Frend, probably 
one of the most famous Paley’s students, recalled that Paley “ragged Locke upon his left knee” in 
the classroom.36 According to the recollection of G. W. Meadley, Paley’s lectures revealed his 
concern with Lockean moral philosophy:  
After these preliminaries Mr. Paley proceeded in the clearest manner to discuss some subject 
in Locke, Clarke, or Butler, or in moral philosophy, pointing out the passages which should be 
read for the next day’s lecturer, and explaining every thing with such force and animation, that 
 
28 M. L. Clarke, Paley: Evidences of the Man (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 1-28. 
29 G. W. Meadley, Memoirs of William Paley (Sunderland, 1809), 8-9. 
30 Clarke (1974), 5. 
31 O’Flaherty (2019), 36. 
32 O’Flaherty (2019), 36. 
33 William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), xxxii. 
34 Meadley (1809), 29-30. 
35 Meadley (1809), 39. 
36 Clarke (1974), 15. 
9 
 
the driest subjects became interesting.37  
Paley and John Law’s mission was to take contextual method to restore the original 
simplicity of scriptural teachings and to uncover divine intentions through natural theology, which 
was consistent with each other.38 Paley gave his lectures on metaphysics in the students’ first year. 
He used Locke’s Essay as a textbook, after which he proceeded to Samuel Clarke’s A Demonstration 
of the Being and Attributes of God (1705) and Joseph Butler’s Analogy of Religion (1736).39 These 
lectures constituted a brief sketch of his Natural Theology. Paley offered his lectures on ethics for 
the second and third years, which were later expanded and completed as his Principles.40 Paley 
also taught all the undergraduates lectures on the Greek New Testament. His model was Locke’s 
The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695) and A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul 
(1705-1707). 41  These lectures on divinity were afterwards advanced in his Evidences and 
developed in his Horae Paulinae (1790). Besides these works, Paley adopted John Gay, Edmund 
Law, Abraham Tucker, David Hume and other early modern thinkers’ primary materials as 
supplement to explain developments in the thought of theological utilitarianism. The discussion in 
the following chapters will reveal that Paley’s moral philosophy was not merely a synthesis and 
collation of his predecessors.  
Paley revealed his teaching method in the use of Scripture as a textbook in the Principles. 
His expressive words and phrases were not only fluent, strong and perspicuous, but also amusing 
and impressive.42 In his lectures on the Greek New Testament and divinity, Paley used Scripture to 
explain Scripture. Paley encouraged his pupils to free themselves and to listen to God, so he just 
“gave them the general sense of the whole, pointed out those passages which deserved peculiar 
attention, and, explaining scripture by scripture, accompanied the whole with suitable moral 
exhortations”.43 This demonstrates that Paley and his latitudinarian contemporaries went back to 
the interpretation of scriptural text itself rather than the allegorical interpretation. The emphasis 
on the original simplicity of texts influenced Paley’s concise writing style in the Principles, which 
will be discussed in detail in the fourth chapter of this thesis. 
 
37 Meadley (1809), 40-41. 
38 O’Flaherty (2019), 38. 
39 Meadley (1809), 41. 
40 Meadley (1809), 42. 
41 Meadley (1809), 42. 
42 Meadley (1809), 42. 
43 Meadley (1809), 42. 
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Paley’s social circle of Cambridge Latitudinarians was characterized by Leslie Stephen as 
“Paley and his school”.44 It was Edmund Law who pushed Paley to develop his lectures on ethics 
into a book and made it a required-reading.45 It was the reformer Thomas Jones who put the 
Principles on university-wide exams after 1787. 46  Paley’s political intentions might have 
disappointed the reformers because he refused to expressly declare his support for the reform of 
the representation of Parliament and for the abolition of subscription. 47  However, Paley’s 
Principles was widely considered to be an excellent work in the sense of Cambridge 
latitudinarianism, which gave a strong answer to the questions of rational religion and theological 
utilitarianism. 48  As LeMahieu concludes, Paley’s group definitely possessed an intellectual  
coherence and cohesion during their days together at Cambridge.49 The main aim of the second 
chapter of this thesis, therefore, is to argue that Paley used natural and revealed theology as 
credible evidence for his theological utilitarianism. 
Owing largely to the efforts of Cambridge latitudinarians, Lockean moral philosophy and 
Newtonian natural philosophy were an integral part of the Cambridge syllabus and correspondingly 
exerted a heavy influence on the institutional and intellectual context there. There was a common 
intellectual context in eighteenth-century Cambridge that mixed natural philosophy, moral 
philosophy as well as Christian theology. The presumed unity of knowledge revealed that truth was 
single in that time. This theory set the tone by Paley and the latitudinarians, and the influence of 
it continued into the eight Bridgewater Treatises during the nineteenth century. 50  William 
Whewell, who authored the third Bridgewater Treatise, wrote that “all truths must be consistent 
with all other truths, and . . . therefore the results of the geology or astronomy cannot be 
irreconcilable with the statements of true theology”.51 Theology provided a key and indispensable 
common principle for both natural and moral philosophy.  
In such a unified context, the benevolence of God became the cornerstone of latitudinarian 
 
44 Stephen (1876), 405. 
45 O’Flaherty (2019), 35. 
46 O’Flaherty (2019), 36. 
47 Clarke (1974), 20. 
48 O’Flaherty (2019), 36-37. 
49 LeMahieu (1976), 14. 
50 Harrison (2015), 150. 
51 William Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences: Founded upon Their History, new ed., 2 vols. (London: John 
Parker, 1847), vol. 2, 571.  
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theology. In his Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke argued that the only thing essential to 
salvation was the trust in “the goodness and the faithfulness of God”.52 Following this belief, the 
latitudinarians firmly believed that morality was an integral part of religion. In order to cultivate 
virtues, they devoted themselves “to discover the true intent of the Deity in creating Beings at all, 
without which we could have no understanding of how to answer the End of his Creation”.53 Since 
God’s benignity was the first premise of Cambridge latitudinarianism, Newtonian natural 
philosophy that revealed the divine benevolence dominated the Cambridge syllabus in the 
eighteenth century.54 The intention of the Lockeans and Cambridge latitudinarians were to find 
general rules in the human affairs that mirrored the achievement of the Newtonians in the natural 
world. It is the theme of this thesis that Paley’s principle of expediency, based on divine 
benevolence, should be thought of as an attempt to establish the “original simplicity” of moral 
philosophy and “to extend the scientific revolution to the realm of ethics”.55 The principle of 
expediency was so central to Paley’s system that I will explore it further in the third chapter of this 
thesis. 
Paley was concerned with utilitarianism when he was an undergraduate at Cambridge. In 
1765, Paley won the Members’ Prize, which was open to senior bachelors for a Latin prose 
composition. The subject proposed was Utrum civitati perniciosior sit Epicuri an Zenonis 
philosophia (a comparison between the stoic and Epicurean philosophy, with respect to the 
influence of each on the morals of a people) in which he championed the Epicureans against the 
Stoics.56 For Paley, the doctrines of Epicurus were favourable to moderated and rational pleasures 
while the strict asceticism of Zeno was inconsistent with human nature.57 However, it was not 
Paley’s intention to support the doctrines of any side. He explained in one of his notes that “the 
intent of this inquiry is not so much to defend the principles of either sect, as to prove the 
insufficiency of both. For neither the welfare of the public is promoted, nor the happiness of the 
 
52 John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures (London, 1695), 249. 
53 Edmund Law, Translator’s Preface to An Essay on the Origin of Evil by William King, the 4th edition corrected by 
Edmund Law (London, 1758), vii. 
54 A. M. C. Waterman, Revolution, Economics and Religion: Christian Political Economy, 1798–1833 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 88. O’Flaherty (2019), 36. 
55 O’Flaherty (2019), 40.  
56 Meadley (1809), 24-25. 
57 Meadley (1809), 25-26. 
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individual secured by either”.58 Paley’s prize essay showed his focus on some moral issues about 
the principles of happiness and utilitarianism which he afterwards expounded in his Principles.59  
Utilitarianism prevailed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In addition to the 
Principles, two other utilitarian books were written at approximately the same time: Jeremy 
Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), and William Godwin’s 
Enquiry concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and Happiness (1793).60 Besides 
them, the most prominent works of eighteenth-century theological utilitarianism were John Gay’s 
“Preliminary Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue and Morality” (1731), 
John Brown’s An Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times (1757), Edmund Law’s Essay 
on the Origin of Evil (1731), a translation of Archbishop William King’s De Origine Mali (1702), 
Abraham Tucker’s The Light of Nature Pursued (1768-1777). Concentrated publications on the 
subject of utilitarianism showed that utilitarianism was another striking feature of the time. 
Fred Rosen questions the contribution of Paley’s Principles to utilitarianism, since utilitarian 
thought in the realms of morality and politics had already been well-established prior to Paley’s 
Principles.61 Rosen uses Ernest Barker’s statement to express his own opinion that Paley was 
viewed as a codifier because of Paley’s skill of the combination and reconciliation of moral and 
theological doctrines in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries into his own system.62 Firstly, 
Rosen points out that Paley constructed an epistemological base of his utilitarian theory largely 
inherited from Locke.63 Rosen quotes from James Crimmins and Isabel Rivers to highlight the 
importance of Locke’s Essay on utilitarianism, including Locke’s rational reliance on Scripture, his 
rejection of the Shaftesburian theory of innate moral sense, and his emphasis on happiness as the 
general standard of virtue.64 Just as Crimmins notices, Rosen points out that the most outstanding 
utilitarians, including Paley, were very much influenced by Locke.65  
Rosen also states that the utilitarian aspect of Paley’s moral and political philosophy was 
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linked with Hume.66 Rosen uses Rivers’ words to show that Paley, just like Hume, gave utility a 
more foundational role and made utility almost the only rule of virtue in his ethics: “the method 
of coming at the will of God by the light of nature is to enquire into the tendency of actions to 
promote or diminish that happiness, i.e. their Utility. This was the keystone of Paley’s argument. 
Ironically, as his critics were to point out, this aspect of his theory linked him with Hume.”67 Rosen 
concludes that “the importance of utility in moral and political thought had already been well-
established prior to Paley”.68 For Rosen, the reason why Paley seemed so important is that Paley 
was the prime target of attacks from Evangelicals from the late eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. 
Thus Rosen claims that Paley’s contribution to utilitarian theory has been exaggerated. 
O’Flaherty, however, argues that although the tradition of utilitarian thought was pre-
established before Paley, “the tradition reached its apogee in 1785 with the publication of William 
Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785)”.69 O’Flaherty holds that although Rosen 
notes the Cambridge educational career of the most prominent utilitarians in the eighteenth 
century, he ignores that the tradition of theological utilitarianism took root at Cambridge where 
Paley’s influence was indeed profound. The fact that the Principles was widely read at Cambridge, 
the East India College, and the United States reveals that the impact of the Principles was 
universally acknowledged in that period. Compared to the poor sales volume of Bentham’s 
Introduction, the continuously printed editions of the Principles and its abridgements until the 
1860s reveal that Paley was viewed as the main representative of theological utilitarian theory.70 
Furthermore, O’Flaherty feels that the impact of the Principles on moral, political and juristical 
culture was not only within Britain but also in the United States in the Antebellum Period. Above 
all, O’Flaherty just agrees with Jerome B. Schneewind that “utilitarianism first became widely 
known in England through the work of William Paley”.71 
 
3. Paley’s Religious Context 
The remarkable contribution of the Principles was Paley’s crucial systemisation of general 
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rules. Paley combined the principle of happiness, namely, all human actions were motivated by the 
pursuit of pleasure or the avoidance of pain, with a concern for rewards and punishments in the 
afterlife. On this basis, he put forward the principle of expediency which provided a scientific 
standard of ethical issues. Paley’s books were delicately knitted and woven. Firstly, the Principles 
set out a theory of theological utilitarianism. And then, the Evidences offered a range of standard 
eighteenth-century external evidence as the form of miracles and prophecy for Christianity. Finally, 
Natural Theology presaged the famous “argument from design” and presented internal evidence 
from natural world. The evidence from natural and revealed religion pointed to the same direction 
that God wills and wishes human happiness that was the foundation of the principle of expediency. 
Paley’s three main works indicates the common theme of the eighteenth-century philosophy, just 
as his own words that he articulated in his Natural Theology: “Of the ‘unity of the Deity’ the proof 
is, the uniformity of plan observable in the universe. The universe itself is a system; each part either 
depending on other parts, or being connected with other parts by some common law of motion, 
or by the presence of some common substance”.72  
Paley’s contribution to theological utilitarianism was not only to render safe and reliable 
criteria for moral quandaries by the introduction of general rules, but also to present ideological 
grounds for social, political and economic issues by the promotion of the utilitarian principle to the 
practical level which, though, are not the main points of this thesis. As O’Flaherty mentions, Paley 
set up a system of moral philosophy by the synthesis of an earlier tradition of theological 
utilitarianism, but for this reason, the Principles as a systematic synthesizer of the researches of his 
predecessors is a perfect case study of eighteenth-century British moral philosophy.73 In addition 
to agreement on O’Flaherty’s view, the fourth chapter of this thesis will put forward an entirely 
new perspective that Paley used synthetic argumentation for his teaching purpose since it should 
be forgotten that the Principles appeared as a textbook at Cambridge.  
Cambridge utilitarians were criticized for reducing religion to its moral core, which was no 
exception for Paley.74 Paley’s utilitarian ethics had many critics, even at the same time of its boom. 
His utilitarianism was not compatible with the atmosphere at Oxford where High Church theology 
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had a dominant position.75 Evangelical critics argued that social customs and institutions in Paley’s 
moral philosophy had a direct influence on the cultivation of moral obligation rather than the will 
of God since the latter one was only a disguise of Paley’s moral philosophy.76 Thomas Gisborne 
attacked the Principles for putting expediency above the authority of Scripture; while the 
Cambridge High Churchman Edward Pearson worried that the calculation of the consequences of 
human conduct seemed very unmoral, which was opposed to the teaching of Scripture.77 William 
Wilberforce also felt that Paley had neglected “that attribute . . . on which so much stress is laid in 
Scripture – I mean His holiness and justice”. Utility, according to Wilberforce, was simply “too low 
a standard of moral right and wrong”.78 Similarly, Samuel Taylor Coleridge argued that Paley knew 
little of revelation and only saw natural religion.79 And Ernest Albee held that Paley’s moral system 
demonstrated “a lack of spirituality”.80 As Coleridge summarized, “assume the existence of God,—
and then the harmony and fitness of the physical creation may be shown to correspond with and 
support such an assumption;—but to set about proving the existence of God by such means is a 
mere circle, a delusion”.81 These critics centered on the gateway of Paley’s moral philosophy to a 
Godless moral system. 
Although, as Clarke summarizes, “Paley’s moral teaching might well be criticized as too 
much based on the values of this world”, a number of twentieth-century interpretations challenged 
the earlier scholarly consensus by rediscovering the theological agenda of Paley’s moral 
philosophy.82 LeMahieu examines the links between Paley and his evangelical and High-Church 
detractor, Bishop Butler, and points out that “both wished to restore revelation to morals; both 
viewed the afterlife as the telic goal of secular living; … and both conceived of religion in highly 
practical term”. 83  LeMahieu’s work also draws readers’ attention to Paley’s sermons which 
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embodies “the elements of devotion and seriousness which nineteenth-century critics accused 
their Enlightenment predecessors of lacking”.84 Similarly, Anthony Waterman has argued that 
Paley’s use of “liturgical and mystical language” in the sermons, which revealed individual 
statements of intense commitment and religious seriousness.85  
Robert Hole feels that although Paley refused to divorce utilitarian moral theory from 
Christianity, Paley believed that God merely enforced morality according to the calculation of the 
principle of utility.86 Hole holds that Paley was a radical secularist in this respect because he 
wanted to abandon the theological parts of his moral theory without hesitation when they made 
his pragmatic and secular agenda untenable.87  O’Flaherty disagrees with Hole on this point. 
Instead, O’Flaherty stresses that Paley’s secular propensities were exactly an expression of pious 
sentiments about God, as Paley regarded the goal of human worldly welfare which was an 
indispensable part of the principle of expediency as the very stuff of Godliness.88 At this point, 
O’Flaherty also responds to Stephen’s view of Hume’s influence on Paley and Paley as a lukewarm 
Christian and worldly philosopher.89 For O’Flaherty, where Hume thought that religious sanctions 
were superfluous to morality, Paley firmly believed that moral philosophy was still deeply 
interwoven with theology. With the consideration of this view, O’Flaherty sticks to Paley’s serious 
theological preference in the Principles and all his other works. One of the main themes of the third 
chapter of this thesis is to elaborate Paley’s commitment to a serious theological agenda by the 
combination of the principle of expediency and Christian charitable impulses. 
 
Conclusion 
In his recent book entitled Utilitarianism in the Age of Enlightenment, O’Flaherty mentions 
that moral philosophy was conceived of as an evidence-based science serving theological purposes 
in the eighteenth century.90 A group of eighteenth-century English religious intellectuals defended 
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religion from the assaults of deists and sceptics, and this fact shows that theological agenda had 
already taken root at their thinking about the betterment of human welfare.91 This thesis takes 
O'Flaherty’s book one step further to investigate three aspects of eighteenth-century definition of 
science, namely, evidence, principle and logic of Paley’s Principles by placing Paley’s thinking about 














The Evidentiary Foundations of Moral Philosophy 
 
Introduction  
This chapter argues that Paley’s moral philosophy was a science because he used credible 
evidence in The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. The goal of science in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries shifted from certainty to probability, which was its most distinctive 
feature. The credibility of probability was in accordance with the mental assent of reasonable 
people by evaluating all the appropriate evidence. Thus, the new knowledge drew forth a 
reconsideration of probability, and a re-evaluation of Scripture and evidence from experience. It is 
clear that Paley attached great importance to the matter of evidence in his works, since his 
Evidences and Natural theology both dealt with the questions of evidence. Section 1 explains that 
because of the influence of skepticism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Paley, 
following his latitudinarian predecessors, sought to discover the will of God by the sources of the 
declarations of Scripture and the light of nature in the Principles. Section 2 argues that Paley 
treated Scripture as testimonial evidence by listing all the biblical chapters he quoted in the 
Principles. It inevitably invites a key question: on what basis Paley would declare Scriptural 
doctrines as credible or rational. 
Section 3 moves on to explain Paley’s view on the credibility of Scripture. On the one hand, 
Paley acknowledged Christ and the apostles as authoritative witnesses of the miracles declared in 
Scripture because of their physical suffering and moral endurance. On this point, the validity of 
Scripture was reducible to the credibility of those who wrote Testaments. On the other hand, Paley 
held that the internal consistency within Scripture embodied the rationality and credibility of its 
contents. Paley’s use of Scripture as a textbook in the field of moral education reveals that he was 
a strong defender of the historical authenticity of Scripture. Section 4 emphasizes another kind of 
evidence Paley used in the Principles, namely, evidence from experience. Paley belonged to the 
tradition that God directly revealed himself to humans. Paley’s discussion about his observations 
of anatomy and daily experience in the Principles, which formed the foundation of his Natural 
Theology, should deserve to be discussed in this section. Section 5 discusses that Paley set up an 
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epistemic standard in the evaluation of the credibility of evidence from experience based on 
frequent personal observations of experience. In the Principles, Scripture inextricably joined with 
evidence from experience, and in the final analysis both were founded to be in perfect agreement. 
Before starting this chapter, the problem of the references and citations in the Principles 
should be explained firstly. Paley explained why he did not refer to any other book or mention any 
other author except Abraham Tucker. With respect to a book about a subject that already known 
by most ordinary people, Paley held that the most important thing was the writer’s mode of 
reasoning, or his judgement of probabilities rather than his use of literature.92 Paley said that “he 
never forgot the use of his understanding, nor was solicitous to show what he knew more than 
what he thought. He never reasoned from memory or spoke from quotation.” 93  Since Paley 
considered himself “to be something more than a mere compiler”, he did not mind giving the 
origins of literature.94 Based on this explanation, this chapter only discusses Scripture as key 
testimonial evidence and does not intend to take Paley’s thinking about Greeks, Romans, Scythians, 
Germans, Americans and Africans which he did not give the sources of literature in the Principles 
into consideration. 
 
1. Reason and Evidence 
In this section, I explain why Paley used evidence taken from revealed and natural religion. 
In the eighteenth century, probability was supposed to be a reasonable guideline in the matters of 
human under the conditions of uncertainty.95 Lorraine Daston holds that because of the skeptical 
revival since the sixteenth century, a group of philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries like John Locke and his followers, Cambridge latitudinarians, developed a new notion of 
rationality. On the one hand they were the advocates of sense-derived data, on the other they 
acknowledged the limitation of the senses and empirical investigation.96 The interplay between 
sense-gained data and the weakness of the senses demonstrated that deductive and 
demonstrative certainty was so rare in the affairs of humankind that it was rational to solve 
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everyday affairs on the basis of imperfect but the most probable epistemic standards.97  
The fallibility of sense could be remedied sometimes by testimonies. Although during that 
period there was a “the issue of how far Christianity could be equated with the exercise of human 
reason unaided by the truths of the Revelation”, John Gascoigne holds that the latitudinarians still 
made concessions to revealed religion by the reading of Scripture without the help of clerical 
guidance.98 When discussing the kinds of evidence used within the Church of England, M.L. Clarke 
states that revealed religion had the important functions of confirming and adding something to 
natural religion in the eighteenth century. 99  On account of the revival of skepticism, these 
philosophers were committed to applying reason to evidence for providing the most rational 
defences for their moral doctrines. Thus, as Peter Harrison mentions, “the dual forms of religion 
came an increasing emphasis upon knowledge and correct belief” in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.100  
The theories of John Tillotson, John Locke and Samuel Clarke were a staple part of the 
Cambridge curriculum in the eighteenth century when Paley was a student there.101 Tillotson, who 
was one of the most prominent of the latitudinarians and became Archbishop of Canterbury in 
1691, held that Christianity must be reasonable and that there was no distinction between reason 
and faith. He believed that revealed religion could revive and improve the natural notions of God 
while divine revelation was necessarily gathered by these natural notions of religion. 102  For 
Tillotson, natural religion must be in harmony with the authenticity of revelation.  
Locke worked out the details of Tillotson’s position in his An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. He followed Tillotson in holding that there was no difference between faith and 
reason in some matters of religion. Locke wrote that: 
Reason is natural revelation, whereby the Father of Light, and fountain of all knowledge, 
communicates to mankind that portion of the truth which he has laid within the reach of their 
natural faculties; revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries 
communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and 
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proofs it gives that they come from God.103  
This paragraph indicates that natural religion was increasingly becoming a part of eighteenth-
century moral philosophy. Although Locke declared that natural religion so sufficiently and clearly 
evidenced a Deity, he still insisted on the need and importance of revelation. 104  For Locke, 
revealed religion as a form of original testimony given by God could remedy the deficiency of 
reason and natural religion: “this way of getting and improving our knowledge in substances only 
by experience and history, which is all that the weakness of our faculties in this state of mediocrity, 
which we are in this world, can attain to; makes me suspect, that natural philosophy is not capable 
of being made a science”.105 
Following Tillotson and Locke, Clarke extended the Cambridge latitudinarian theological 
theory into the eighteenth century. His disputation topic in 1709 for the Cambridge doctorate of 
divinity, namely, No Article of the Christian Faith delivered in the Holy Scriptures, is Disagreeable to 
Right Reason and Without the Liberty of Humane Actions there can be no Religion, indicates that 
both revealed and natural religion were the means of arriving at a knowledge of God and human 
moral duty.106 Gascoigne argues that this disputation focused on the issues that how far the will 
of God could be discovered by the rational analysis of humankind without the help of revelation.107 
For Clarke the primary end of Christianity was to promote moral behaviour which could largely be 
obtained by the use of human reason.108  
In the meantime, Clarke argued that every Christian doctrine had a direct and powerful 
influence on human moral manners and was thought of as an aid to moral behaviour.109 As 
Gascoigne concludes, revelation could not be separated from natural theology in Clarke’s scheme 
of theology.110 Clarke followed the main outlines of Tillotson and Locke to maintain the need of 
the reconciliation of revealed and natural religion to discover the will of God and direct human 
moral actions. According to the emphasis of Locke and Cambridge Latitudinarians, revealed and 
natural religion did not stand in opposition to each other. They both provide evidence that could 
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be used to improve human morals.  
Paley belonged to this eighteenth-century tradition. In common with his Cambridge 
latitudinarian generation, Paley believed that morality was not a complete science in itself. He 
wanted to build a general system of moral philosophy on account of evidence of natural and 
revealed theology. In the preface of the Principles, he argued that “let the sanctions of Christianity 
never be forgotten; […]: religion will appear to be the voice of reason, and morality will be the will 
of God”.111 According to Paley, without human reasoning upon moral questions, any conclusion 
was vain; Scripture might add to and support the probability of the conclusions pursued by the 
light of nature.112 As M. L. Clarke mentions, Paley believed that revealed religion could confirm 
natural religion and give it greater certainty.113  
Paley’s view on the kinds of evidence relevant to moral philosophy reflects the strong 
influence of Locke and Samuel Clarke on him. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Paley attended Mr. 
Backhouse’s lectures in logic, metaphysics and moral philosophy at Christ’s College, in which the 
doctrines of Locke and Clarke were principally discussed. Based on their ideas, Paley recommended 
two main kinds of evidence to ascertain the will of God in the Principles. One is Scripture and the 
other is nature, particularly God's design in his works.114 Paley advised people to pursue moral 
questions by the light of nature firstly, and then to inquire whether anything reasoned from nature 
matches with Scripture.115 For Paley, both revealed and natural religion provided evidence for his 
readers who demanded reasonable grounds for their moral actions. 
In the Principles, Paley stated that evidence was clearly required in the formulation of belief. 
He recommended that students should “pause and tarry at every proposition, till they have traced 
out its dependency, proof, relation, and consequences, before they permit themselves to step on 
to another.”116 Paley took evidence and proof to be valuable, and sought to establish rational basis 
of his moral philosophy. A question then arose for Paley that is what kinds of evidence obtained 
from revealed and natural religion in the Principles could indicate the will of God. In the letter (1785) 
to Edmund Law, Paley presented some criteria, such as “by a diligent and faithful examination of 
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the original record, dismisses from the system one article which contradicts the apprehension, the 
experience, or the reasoning of mankind”.117 The key words of Paley’s idea of evidence to discover 
the will of God can be extracted from this text, such as “the original record”, “the experience”, and 
“the reasoning of mankind”, which will be discussed in the following sections to demonstrate that 
Paley sought to unite the natural notions of God with the precepts of revelation to accomplish his 
system of morality.  
In his works, Paley adhered to this epistemological hierarchy that Scripture was regarded 
as supplementary to natural religion. Scripture introduced “the deity to human apprehension, 
under an idea … more personal than the theology of nature can do”.118 But natural theology was 
“the firm foundation to rest our foot upon”.119 After several editions of his Evidences and Principles 
had become Cambridge textbooks, Paley claimed that the subject and theme of his next work 
would complete his philosophical and intellectual system which consisted of “the evidences of 
natural religion, the evidences of revealed religion, and an account of the duties that result from 
both”.120 As LeMahieu mentions, the order in which Paley’s books ought to be read is the reverse 
of the order in which they were written. Natural Theology, being the last of his works, is considered 
first and followed by the Evidences. They both form the bedrock of the Principles.121 In the next 
few sections, I will argue how Scripture and nature were treated as evidence and fit together in the 
Principles. 
 
2. Scripture as Testimonial Evidence  
In this section, I explain why Paley considered Scriptural testimony as a viable form of 
evidence for a scientific system of moral philosophy. Edmund Paley, the son of William Paley, who 
wrote a biography of his father entitled An Account of the Life and Writings of William Paley (1825), 
pointed out that a main source of evidence used by his father was “the books of the New 
Testament”, which he believed “were written by the authors to whom they are ascribed”. 122 
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According to Edmund Paley’s further explanation, his father held that “there is no more reason to 
doubt but the Gospels were Matthew’s, Mark’s, Luke’s, and John’s; the Epistles, St. Paul’s, St. 
Peter’s, St. James, &c.”123  
Paley held that one way to assess the authenticity of evidence was to trace the lineage of 
its original and authoritative historical sources. The chapter “Of The Scripture Account of Sabbatical 
Institutions” in the Principles evinces this kind of assessment of Scripture. Paley discussed two 
questions in this chapter. The first question is whether the Jewish sabbatical institution extended 
to Christians. The second question is whether any new command about this institution was 
delivered by the authority or example of Christ and his apostles.124 In order to answer the first 
question, Paley collected the accounts that are preserved in the Old Testament which he viewed 
as the authentic record of the Jewish history. He held that the content of Old Testament was not 
false since it was kept by the Jews who had no reason to forge inaccurate testimony.125 He cited 
evidence from Genesis, Exodus, Ezekiel, Nehemiah, and gave his own opinion that the transaction 
in the wilderness was the first actual institution of the sabbath.126 Accordingly, the consistency of 
the different narratives in Scripture cited by Paley led him to affirm the historical authenticity of 
particular doctrinal traditions in Scripture, and to argue that the sabbath was only instituted for 
the Jews.  
Paley smoothly moved on to the second question: if the sabbatical institution was only a 
law to Jews, whether any new command upon this subject was delivered by the authority of Christ 
or his apostles. After considering plenty of evidence from the New Testament’s Gospel of John, the 
Acts of the Apostles, and the letters of St. Paul, Paley concluded that, although the practice of 
holding religious assemblies upon the first day of the week was so early and universal in the early 
Christian Church, “the opinion, that Christ and his apostles meant to retain the duties of the Jewish 
sabbath, shifting only the day from the seventh to the first, seems to prevail without sufficient 
proof; nor does any evidence remain in Scripture […].”127 In this example, Paley regarded Scripture 
as evidence which was instituted by the propositions of Christ and the apostles.  
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Besides the examples mentioned above, Paley used the books in Scripture to argue his 
principles of moral philosophy throughout the Principles. He cited the contents of 1 Peter, 2 Peter, 
1 Corinthians and James to discuss his idea of moral virtue.128 To explain his detailed classification 
of moral duties, Paley used the Old Testament books of Genesis, 129  Exodus,130  Leviticus, 131 
Deuteronomy,132 Psalms,133 and Zechariah.134 From the New Testament, Paley used evidence 
taken from Matthew, 135  Luke, 136  John, 137  Acts, 138  Romans, 139  1 Corinthians, 140  2 
Corinthians,141 Galatians,142 Ephesians,143 Philippians,144 Colossians,145 1 Thessalonians,146 1 
Thimothy,147 Hebrews,148 James.149  
Moreover, Paley regarded Scripture’s depiction of miracles as sound evidence as well. In 
this sense, he asserted that some Christian revelation was so supernatural and distinctive that it 
could only be explained by miracles. In the chapter entitled “Of Reverencing The Deity”, Paley 
highlighted the inestimable importance of a message by which God’s mission was introduced and 
attested and through which the wisest people could find an answer to their doubts and 
inquiries.150 Paley thought that the eyewitness accounts of miracles or prophets, and some certain 
religious doctrines of such wise authors were valid. The trustworthiness and authority of evidence 
were reduced to the capacity to witness miracles. It was for this reason that Paley was concerned 
to show that the metaphysical dogmas of Scripture were historically authentic. 
Overall, Paley was a devout exponent of the authority of the written revelation of God in 
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Scripture. He gave credence to the evidence provided by highly reliable persons such as the 
prophets and apostles. In the words of Edmund Paley, his father accepted such authors as those 
who “places the authenticity of the Scripture beyond any controversy—beyond the authenticity of 
any other book in the world”. 151  To Paley, the authority of Scripture relied on the different 
authoritative authors of Scripture corresponding with each other. A belief in Christian doctrines is 
equated with a belief in Christ and persons who God revealed him in. 
 
3. The Credibility of Scripture  
This section explains Paley’s discussion of the credibility of Scripture. In the Principles, 
Paley’s insistence on the use of Scripture in articulating belief invites questions about the credibility 
and reliability of Scripture. In a letter (1785) to the Bishop of Carlisle, Edmund Law, Paley said that 
“whatever renders religion more rational, renders it more credible”. 152  Based on the debate 
between Paley and David Hume, Paley held that the credibility of Scripture was authorized by Christ 
and the apostles, and its own internal consistency.  
Paley’s view on the epistemic side of Scripture seen as opinion warranted by authority can 
be explained in detail by Ian Hacking’s words. Following the epistemic tradition of the Middle Ages, 
scientia was knowledge that was necessarily true in logical terms. It was obtained by demonstrative 
and deductive reasoning.153 The opposite of scientia was opinion. For medieval thinkers, opinion 
did not refer to self-evidential belief or doctrines. In this sense, opinion was contrasted with the 
traditional rationality of demonstrative certainty. The credibility of opinion relied on the authority 
either given in authoritative books or supported by prestigious people.154 In the seventeenth 
century, there was a criterion that “the true religion taught and established by the apostles”.155 
Thomas Sprat, one of the key members of the Royal Society, wrote that “Christ himself … was … to 
introduce a rational, moral, spiritual Doctrine, and a plain, unaffected, saving way of teaching it.”156 
In this statement, Christianity as a propositional religion was instituted by the authority of Christ 
and his apostles.  
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Paley accepted Christ and the apostles as the authority of the historical authenticity of the 
Scripture. His discussion in the Evidences mainly focused on the topic of miracles which had long 
been regarded as the main grounds for the truth of Christianity. Apologists like Samuel Clarke saw 
miracles as “the positive and direct proof of His Divine Commission”.157 Joseph Butler regarded 
Scripture as “an authentic, genuine history” and miracles as “historical evidence”.158 In common 
with these predecessors, Paley’s Evidences embodies a series of standard and orthodox arguments 
about miracles. Harrison thinks that Paley’s Evidences provides a series of pieces of external 
evidence for Christianity, and then explains that external evidence is to do with the credibility of 
persons or books which promulgated particular doctrines.159 In this sense, people’s reliance on 
Scripture was because they could not be at the scene. They valued the experience of Christ and 
the apostles who are outside of them rather than their own. This is the reason that the authors of 
the Port Royal Logick (1662) called the evidence of testimony external or extrinsic.160 According to 
Paley, certain evidence in the form of miracles declared in Scripture was authorized by the 
experience of Christ and the apostles. The credibility of Scripture was reducible to the credibility 
of its witnesses.  
The strongest objection to the credibility of Christ and the apostles during the eighteenth 
century came from Hume’s An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748). Hume argued 
that miracles violated the natural order established by “firm and unalterable experience”.161 Hume 
held that like all beliefs, the credibility of any testimony relied upon long and invariable experience 
which is trustworthy. However, a miracle in itself was contrary to universal experience and was a 
breach of the laws of nature. According to this, Hume concluded that “it appears that no testimony 
for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof”.162 
Paley argued that Hume’s rejection of miracles was based on a presupposed view of 
theological argumentation. According to Paley, Hume’s objection that the existence of miracles 
violated the unalterable laws of nature was based on Hume’s preestablished repudiation of the 
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existence of a Deity. Paley mentioned that for Hume “miracles are alike incredible to him who is 
previously assured of the constant agency of a Divine Being, and to him who believes that no such 
Being exists in the universe”.163 However, because Paley assumed that God was the maker of the 
laws of nature, he accepted that God should have and reserve the ability to vary such laws which 
was established by him and might do so for his will and purposes on earth. From this, Paley pointed 
out that “once believe that there is a God, and miracles are not incredible”.164  
Given his Cambridge education, Paley upheld Newton’s view that divine design was a 
constant progress.165  In order to reconcile the invariability of the laws of nature with divine 
continuous actions in the universe, Paley first claimed that “Where he [God] acts, he is; and where 
he is, he perceives”.166 Just as John Ray’s Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation 
(1691) that is a basis of Paley’s Natural Theology demonstrated, there must be “some external 
intelligent Agent, either God himself immediately, or some Plastick Nature”.167 The core analogy 
in Natural Theology underlines the necessity of a constantly divine agency. The fact that the watch 
has a designer embodies that a “power, distinct from mechanism, is, at this present time, acting 
upon it”, and convinced Paley that “mechanism, without power, can do nothing”.168 According to 
this analogy, Paley drew a conclusion that “mechanical dispositions, fixed beforehand by an 
intelligent appointment”.169  
Based on such expressions of ongoing agency, Paley presented an image of a personal Deity 
who are involved in the whole universe.170 Although the laws of nature were uniform and universal, 
the Almighty certainly reserved “the power of winding and turning as he pleases, the course of 
causes which issue from himself”, and did “in fact interpose to alter or intercept effects”.171 For 
Paley, this was “not only . . . a creative, but . . . a continuing care”.172 Just as one of Paley’s 
contemporary Cambridge latitudinarians, Edmund Law, wrote, “Were the laws of nature absolutely 
fix’d and unalterable what room . . . would there be left for the particular duties of faith, hope, and 
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trust in God . . . in short, for any kind of duty and devotion towards him, — unless we really believe 
that he has the disposal of events, and that he will direct them for our benefit?”173 Viewed in this 
context, there was no contradiction between the idea of miracles and the invariable laws of nature.  
Aside from doubt about the existence of miracles itself, Hume moved on to question those 
people who claimed to witness miracles. As to witnesses’ credit, jurists distilled the theory of legal 
proof derived from Roman and canon law from the period of the sixteenth to seventeenth 
centuries.174 Confessions, oaths, written documents, and witness all were regarded as legal proof 
and applied to the judgement of this jurisprudence during the period.175 As Daston summarizes, 
“judges were advised to consider the reputation of the witness; his age, sex, and social status; his 
relationship to the accused; any private interest in the case; and comportment under interrogation 
(paleness, vacillation, and timorous manner all reduced credibility).”176 To some degree, this legal 
thinking  about evidence means what is significant is who says it, not what is said. It seems that 
credibility might be independent of the content of the testimony. For Hume, the moral elements 
of informants, including the freedom of action, social standing, the level of education, and the 
codes of honor and virtue, were decisive factors.177  
In regard to the credibility of the apostles as witnesses, Hume argued that they could not 
be trusted since they were uneducated and were lacking of good sense.178 Hume argued that there 
was no miracle undoubted enough attested by a sufficient number of people of unquestioned good 
sense and education who could make sure such miracles were not out of their own delusion 
throughout the whole course of history.179 Upon the whole, Hume claimed that the apostles 
lacked such credit and reputation which are requisite for a full assurance of testimony. 
In order to refute Hume’s claim, Paley claimed that the credibility of Christ and the apostles 
was authorized by their own experience and situation. Paley maintained that the appearance and 
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existence of Christianity as a credible religion was due to its founder and his associates, and the 
extreme labours, dangers and sufferings from Judaism and Roman power they encountered. The 
apostles voluntarily defended their faith at the risk of persecution and at the cost of lives of danger 
and hardship, which ensured the reliability of their activities. Paley affirmed that: 
there cannot much doubt remain upon our minds, but that a number of persons at that time 
appeared in the world, publicly advancing an extraordinary story, and for the sake of 
propagating the belief of that story, voluntarily incurring great personal dangers, traversing 
seas and kingdoms, exerting great industry, and sustaining great extremities of ill usage and 
persecution.180  
In other words, Paley refused to judge the credibility and reliability of the apostles according to 
Hume’s criteria, namely, education, good sense and social status. Paley thought that these 
elements had no relevance to an inner conviction. Instead, Paley concluded that the apostles 
possessed the proper credentials to validate their testimony because of their personal qualities, 
moral endurance and resilience against ruthless torture. 
The authority of witnesses at this time was linked to wider understanding of rationality. The 
moral and social status of informants might be supposed to be proof against lying, but not against 
error. The internal consistency of the content of testimony should be considered as well.181 There 
was a further appeal of intellectual assent to the contents and propositions of testimony.182 Faith 
in a person came down to give credence to the propositions given by that person. Belief in a person 
meant that believing the rationality of the content of testimony given by and associated with that 
person. 
Like many eighteenth-century intellectuals, Paley held that the evaluation of unquestioning 
belief depended on the physical courage, personal dedication and moral endurance of witnesses 
as well as the internal consistency of testimony. Paley used this principle in all his works. In his 
Evidences, for example, he extracted heavily from Nathaniel Lardner’s The Credibility of the Gospel 
History (1727-1755). Paley showed his admiration of Lardner’s work by drawing on his research of 
ancient sources for his own discussion of the historical credibility of Scripture.183 Paley shared 
Lardner’s view that the consistency and harmony between different Gospels embodied the truth 
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and credibility of Scripture.184 In the Principles, Paley cited many different declarations of Scripture 
in order to articulate a certain topic. For instance, he used the narratives of 1 Peter, 2 Peter, 1 
Cornithians and James to reinforce one another and prove his viewpoint of moral virtue.185 Thus, 
as pointed out by Edmund Paley, his father paid attention to internal evidence “that which arises 
from the contents of the books themselves”.186 Paley emphasized that the consistence of the 
different narratives of Scripture reinforced the credibility of Scripture. 
In sum, on the one hand, the authority of Scripture was legitimated by the credibility of 
Christ and his apostles; on the other hand, the internal consistency between different narratives 
of Scripture signified the reliability of the contents of this book. Paley held that “the truth of 
Christianity depends upon its leading facts”, and all facts together are “a body of strong historical 
evidence”.187 For the testimony of moral doctrines to be reasonable, it must meet this standard 
which Paley expressed clearly in the Evidences and applied directly in the Principles.  
 
4. Evidence from Experience 
In this section, I argue, in addition to scriptural evidence, Paley used another kind of evidence, 
namely, evidence taken from personal experience. Harrison argues that from the seventeenth 
century, there was an increasing stress on the usage of such evidence in works that argued for the 
inherent rationality of Christianity. Accordingly, the religious literature of early modern England 
was full of terms like “grounds”, “reasons”, “evidences”, and “proofs”.188 Paley’s effort to build a 
rational defence for Christianity extended this tradition. Prior to writing the Principles, Paley gave 
sermons entitled “The Being of God Demonstrated in the Works of Creation”. These sermons 
formed the epistemological framework for evidence from experience in his Principles, and were 
eventually integrated into Natural Theology.189  
The notion of “the argument from design” with the concept of divinely imposed and 
universal laws of nature was the mainstream ideology in the eighteenth century. It was a belief 
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that the existence of God could be learned from God’s designs in the world.190 In that time, the 
study of nature, such as John Ray’s Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation (1691), 
William Derham’s Physico Theology (1713) and Bernard Nieuwentyt’s The Religious Philosopher 
(1718), had already provided the rational evidence of Christianity. Reading “the book of nature” 
authored divinely came down to the principles of design since the Divinity was “represented to the 
understanding by its own remarks, its own reflections and its own reasonings”.191 Paley held, in 
addition, that the evidence of their own senses rather than “any language that can be used by 
others” would leave a deeper impress on human.192 In other words, the interactive process that 
nature was read for the teleologically systematic investigation of its underlying arguments from 
design would produce a firmer conviction of a wise and powerful Deity.  
Paley agreed with Locke that “the works of nature everywhere sufficiently evidenced a Deity” 
and that “a rational creature who will but seriously reflect on them cannot miss the discovery of a 
deity”.193 A paragraph of words in Paley’s Natural Theology exemplified his view of evidence taken 
from his experience of the natural world: 
In a moral view, I shall not, I believe, be contradicted when I say, that, if one train of thinking 
be more desirable than another, it is that which regards the phenomena of nature with a 
constant reference to a supreme intelligent Author. To have made this the ruling, the habitual 
sentiment of our minds, is to have laid the foundation of every thing which is religious. The 
world from thenceforth becomes a temple,……The works of nature want only to be 
contemplated.194 
The evidence observed from the experience of nature is also elaborated in chapter “The Divine 
Benevolence” in the Principles, which was eventually expanded to Natural Theology. Harrison 
holds that “the latter work was thus concerned with internal evidences, drawn almost 
exclusively from the design argument”.195 Thus, it is worth discussing the “The Benevolence 
Divine” chapter at length because it presents a helpful picture of Paley’s view about evidence 
from experience. 
The empirical evidence that Paley used in the Principles was based on his own 
observations of nature and human body, especially anatomy. Anatomy was the basic source of 
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evidence of physico-theologies from the seventeenth to early nineteenth centuries.196 Paley, for 
example, discussed teeth at the beginning of his arguments. Based on his observation of teeth, 
Paley held that they were designed for chewing, not for aching.197 He then moved on to discuss 
other parts of human body, such as ducts, kidneys and glands. In the same way, Paley argued 
that ducts were not designed to convey the gravel to the kidneys, and glands were not designed 
to cause gout.198 According to these personal observations of anatomy, Paley confirmed that 
evil might be called a defect of design, but it was not the object of it.199 According to Paley, 
observing and reasoning from nature could prove the benevolent personality of God because 
God directly revealed himself through nature. 
Paley also employed the observations taken from daily life. He thought that sickles were 
made for husbandry, not for cutting the reaper’s fingers.200 Drawing from domestic life, Paley 
insisted that children’s happiness was described as an object of one of the purest forms of 
enjoyment while the pleasure of adulthood might be considered as the product of an adult’s 
own development and education.201 The happiness of children that existed beyond children 
themselves was a clear example of human happiness provided by a benevolent God. In children’s 
happiness, Paley perceived “a kind of sensible evidence of the finger of God, and of the 
disposition which directs it”.202 On the whole, Paley concluded that the evidence taken from the 
experience of the animate could be used to offer a credible and rational defence for the 
existence of God’s benevolence. 
Paley held that empirical evidence through its properties could point to another thing 
beyond it. In the chapter “Of the Personality of the Deity” in his Natural Theology, for instance, 
Paley gave a deeper explanation about his view on how empirical evidence gained from personal 
experience pointed out something else beyond and outside itself, namely, a superior designer.203 
That why Harrison says that Paley’s Natural theology is acknowledged to afford internal evidence 
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for the truth of the existence of God.  
For eighteenth-century natural philosophers, the contemplation of nature educed many 
instances of God’s design of his creatures. An ongoing and systematic investigation of nature was 
directed to uncover the underlying principles that pointed to the existence of a wise and 
benevolent Deity in a way that goes beyond the allegorical theological significance. Paley 
concluded that nature provided accurate evidence of the dispositions of a benevolent 
designer.204 If the reliance on the declarations in Scripture might be judged as a subjective 
feeling of enthusiasm, the personal experience of nature expanded the dimensions of 
Christianity by affording empirical facts. In turn, natural theology reaffirmed the authenticity of 
evidence from revealed religion and awakened the strong feelings of a benevolent Deity. As 
LeMahieu concluded, in Paley’s moral philosophy, “in its power to reaffirm and enlarge an 
existing faith in God, it led men back to revelation, the recorded testament of God’s intervention 
in history”.205 
 
5. The Credibility of Evidence from Experience 
In this section, I explain why Paley thought the credibility of experience rested on people’s 
own constant observations and the authority of observers themselves. In addition to testimony as 
“opinion” derived from authority, Hacking introduces another kind of evidence as “natural signs” 
correlated by experience.206 For Hacking, this kind of evidence was derived from sixteenth-century 
low sciences and based on frequent observations. In this sense, the credibility of this kind of 
evidence was on account of the numerical accumulation of evidence from experience. The degrees 
of certainty of this kinds of evidence depended on mathematical frequency of experience, which 
was very different from the classical evidence of testimony. Just as Butler said, the degrees of 
assurance of empirical evidence depended on the constancy of human experience. 207  Thus, 
Daston concludes that “the constant experience that facts conform to these principles is our sole 
reason to believe them.”208 
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The revival of skepticism in the late sixteenth century brought about a new form of 
knowledge and new claims about the degrees of probability. Because of the suspicion of senses, it 
was necessary for the intellectuals of that era to reconsider the complex problems of certainty. 
According to the table below, they distinguished between the degrees of certainty and probability, 
and were satisfied with moral certainty which was the highest level of probability available where 
observation and experience were concerned. This level of probability was not a simple collection 
of matters of fact, but an interaction between subjective judgments and objective facts. Although 
assent was not compelled, reasonable people was certain of his own observation and experience. 
A brief sketch of some of the core arguments employed by Paley’s predecessors to justify the 
credibility of evidence from experience would be helpful to characterizing Paley’s contribution to 
this debate. 
FIGURE 1209 
Knowledge                    Method                  Certainty 
God’s knowledge none (creation) absolute, infallible, certainty 
Science A: mathematics, 
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The Port Royal Logick was the first to combine the reliability of testimony with semi-
quantified probability. Daston says that “the Port Royal authors recommend two criteria: the 
intrinsic credibility of the fact itself; and the extrinsic credibility of the witnesses”.210 The former 
means inherent rationality of belief. The authors of Logick still paid attention to the extrinsic 
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credibility, however they thought that the assessment of certain evidence should be also guided 
by “what happens incomparably more often in the evaluation of these circumstance”.211 When 
historical witnesses and documents conflicted with each other, the Port Royal authors suggested 
that people should make a judgement in accordance with what happened “incomparably more 
often”. 
Locke represented the culmination of a generation’s attempt to devise a new theory of 
knowledge appropriate to the experiential evidence of the era. Locke sought to find out a rule for 
the rational judgement of evidence from experience in “Of Probability” and “Of the Degrees of 
Assent” which reveals that experience and belief were the objective and subjective aspects of a 
single psychological operation.212 Locke held that constant experience should produce conviction. 
Experience generated credibility and probability by the repeated sensations following the same 
conduct happened in past. The frequency of experience was correlated to the intensity of the 
mental association, which in turn intensified beliefs. 213  Hence the objective credibility of 
experience and the subjective assent of belief were interoperable in a well-ordered mind. 
Locke held that “highest probability amounts not to certainty; without which there can be 
no knowledge”, however, he still acknowledged the existence of rational assent of propositions 
without certainty. Locke believed that the strength and intensity of empirical evidence varied “as 
the conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of observations, as the frequency of and 
constancy of experience”.214 According to this, he established the degrees of knowledge, starting 
with certainty and demonstration which correspond to the degrees of assent from full assurance 
and confidence down to conjecture, doubt, and distrust.215 For Locke, although probability was 
inferior to demonstrative knowledge, the constant observations from experience offered a very 
strong credibility.  
Under the influence of skepticism, Paley only sought to prove the existence of God beyond 
reasonable doubt, and he knew that deductive logical proofs for human experience were 
impossible. For Paley, empirical evidence of God’s actions was probable. He mentioned that “the 
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light of nature leaves human to controverted probabilities”.216 In the Principles, Paley argued the 
Copernican system was just a singular probability since Copernicus was the same person who both 
discovered and proved, and concluded that “it is idle to say, that a future state had been discovered 
already”.217 That is, Copernicanism was probable and just the best one supported by the strongest 
argument at that time. In this sense, Paley accepted that knowledge based on evidence from 
personal observation and experience was not necessarily true in logical terms. 
Although a conviction of belief did not have to depend on a rigorously demonstrative 
evidence, a certain degree of rational grounds for belief was necessary. In Natural Theology, Paley 
said that empirical evidence of nature was founded upon uniform experience.218 Because of this 
experience, a person himself was a witness to the actual formation and situation of things. 
Moreover, Paley held that what happened more constantly in experience offered a higher level of 
credibility. He said that this resemblance which a Deity constantly produces in the world of nature 
left people under the smallest doubt.219 For Paley, the accumulation of evidence from experience 
formed a solid foundation for his moral knowledge. 
For the thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, certainty was beyond human 
reason in human affairs, however, the degrees of probability were accessible. For the most ordinary 
reader, Paley thought that evidence obtained by stable investigations was the most generally 
acknowledged and was supposed to be true.220 Paley’s utterances of the relationship between the 
frequency of experience, the degrees of probability, and the intensity of belief belonged to the 
tradition of his day. In the Principles, Paley used the sentence pattern “it is (seems) or it is probable” 
seventeen times.221 There are other phrases like “by probable arguments at least”, “the most 
probable that he could proceed by”, and “upon a probable reason being suggested” in the 
Principles.222  The certainty and credibility of evidence from experience did not have to be a 
demonstration from axioms that were self-evident but must be the most probable at least which 
could exclude any other available option and remove any reasonable doubt in his moral philosophy. 
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Although Paley confessed in the Principles that he did not examine any doubts, encounter any 
errors, discuss any obscurities or advert to any controversies, he firmly believed the existence of 
rational evidence even if among these doubts, errors, obscurities and controversies.223 Without 
evidence derived from personal observations and repeated trails, there was only “habitual 
opinion”.224 Due to the limited understanding of humankind, Paley concluded that “in human 
affairs, probability ought to content us”.225  
Therefore, Paley made natural and revelated religion work hand in hand in the determining 
of the will of God. In Natural Theology, Paley confirmed again that “his inward veneration of this 
great Being, will incline him to attend with the utmost seriousness, not only to all that can be 
discovered by concerning him by researches into nature, but to all that is taught by a revelation, 
which gives reasonable proof of having proceeded from him”.226 Meanwhile, he “combined with 
the conclusion of reason the declarations of Scripture, … , as of co-ordinate authority.”227 Through 
evidence both from experience and Scripture, Paley contented that people could gain a reasonable 
basis for the conception of the will of God. 
 
Conclusion 
It was the purpose of this chapter to examine the kinds of evidence that Paley used in his 
Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. With the shift of the definition of science, most English 
intellectuals were very satisfied with a highly probable knowledge by the end of the seventeenth 
century. A family of related and overlapping concepts, such as reason, evidence experience, 
testimony, credibility and probability, played a major role in shaping science of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. As Shapiro mentions, “moral decision making, like religious belief and 
scientific evaluation, required a reasoned calculation of probabilities based on the best and the 
most complete information and evidence available”.228 Before making efforts to establish moral 
principles, these thinkers felt it necessary to show what kinds of evidence could formed solidly 
rational foundation for their moral principles. 
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Section 2 and Section 4 examined Scripture as testimonial evidence, and evidence from 
experience that Paley used in the Principles respectively. Paley stressed on the evidential value of 
Scripture, both the Old Testament, which he regarded as the authentic records of the history of 
Jews, and the New Testament, which he saw as the undoubted religious doctrines authorized by 
Christ and the apostles. Section 4 addressed evidence that Paley took from his experience of nature, 
especially evidence from body organs and human daily life, by which Paley firmly believed that the 
divine benevolence was sufficiently revealed. 
Section 3 and Section 5 explained the criteria of the credibility Paley applied to Scripture 
and evidence from experience in the Principles. Paley held that physical suffering, personal 
dedication and moral perseverance rather than social status, the level of education and the code 
of honour and virtues which were generally accepted standard in the eighteenth century and were 
used by Hume to attack the credibility of the apostles, were the criteria of the credibility of Christ 
and the apostles. Moreover, Paley attached importance to the internal consistence and 
concurrence of the different narratives in Scripture. Section 5 explained that Paley endeavored to 
establish empirical standards for the evaluation of evidence from experience in the context of 
uncertainty. Paley followed the eighteenth-century tradition of skepticism to acknowledge that the 
rational assessment of the credibility of evidence from experience was derived from constant 
observations of experience. This kind of credibility was based on numerical accumulations. 
Paley valued revelation as Scripture, and natural theology as evidence from experience, as 
viable evidence that could be used in a scientific system of moral philosophy. Just like O’Flaherty 
says, the task of Paley’s Principles was simply to “reassure his readers that natural theology was 
not corrosive to Scriptural faith”. 229  This chapter agreed with Daston that Paley found a 
considerable satisfaction in moral probability that was sufficient for a reasonable person to believe 
the principles of happiness and expediency divinely imposed, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
 




Moral Law and the Principle of Expediency 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I argue that Paley established the principle of expediency as the basis of his 
understanding of a moral law in the Principles. At the beginning of his book, Paley noted that 
“Moral Philosophy, Morality, Ethics, Casuistry, Natural Law, mean all the same thing; namely, that 
science which teaches men their duty and the reasons of it”.230 As his definition suggests, Paley 
endeavored to arrive at a general rule which could clearly teach all people their duty and give them 
practical rules in human affairs. Paley wanted the principle of expediency to work in the moral 
realm in the same way that Newton’s principles of gravitation did in the world of nature. Section 1 
discusses Paley’s motivation to set up a better moral law and the inadequacies and limitations of 
current laws, Scripture and an innate moral sense. Section 2 argues that Paley regarded private 
happiness as a motive of human behaviour in his moral philosophy in order to compensate for 
those deficiencies mentioned above. Section 3 avers that Paley combined virtuous self-interest 
with Christian eschatology and refined his moral philosophy on the basis of the principle of 
expediency. In the Principles, the combination of Christian theology and the principle of expediency 
played a significant role in both earthly and heavenly happiness. In this way, Paley provided a core 
principle that he could use to make a moral system of knowledge for thoughtful people who 
demanded a reasonable explanation of duty and a universally valid guide for ordinary application 
which conformed to their Christian faith.  
 
1. Inadequate Laws and Instincts 
In the eighteenth century, moral philosophy was supposed to provide general rules to 
human conduct.231 Paley defined moral philosophy as a science which teaches men their duty and 
governs their actions. 232  Just like divinely authored laws of nature would replace the inner 
qualities of natural things, divinely authored moral laws would similarly replace human virtues. If 
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grasping natural laws could conquer the natural world, comprehending moral laws could indicate 
the direction of human conduct. This tradition attempted to do for moral philosophy what Newton 
had done for natural philosophy. As Mary Poovey writes, “eighteenth-century British moral 
philosophers sought to assimilate cultural otherness because, like the Newtonian natural 
philosophers whose method they emulated, they assumed that ‘facts’ emerged at the level of 
universals or abstractions, not individuals”.233 Paley was part of this tradition, but he found that 
none of the current moral laws and instincts were perfect guides to human behaviour. To solve this 
problem, Paley devoted himself to finding a better moral law in the Principles. He wanted to solve 
the limitations he saw in the contemporary laws, rules and instincts used to judge and direct human 
moral conduct. This section identifies these limitations with a view to showing why Paley opted to 
eventually choose to base his moral law upon the principles of happiness and expediency. 
For Paley, “the doctrine of general rules pervades and connects the whole”.234 In the 
Principles, Paley was concerned less with the theoretical knowledge of ethics and more with the 
practical instructions of daily life based on the application of principles. Accordingly, Paley held that 
general rules were essential to any moral philosophy for the purpose of practical application. In 
“any dispensation, whose object is to influence the conduct of reasonable creatures”, if the moral 
government of the world punished one of two identical actions while it rewarded the other, 
“rewards and punishments would cease to be such, – would become accidents”.235 The “full and 
constant consideration” of general rules, according to Paley, made any moral system “satisfactory 
or consistent”, and made the application of it “clear and easy”.236 
Paley admitted that the use of general rules was deeply entwined with the consideration 
of the consequences of an action. Any moral action should be considered in reference to its 
particular and general consequences. Paley said that “The particular bad consequence of an action, 
is the mischief which that single action directly and immediately occasions. The general bad 
consequence is, the violation of some necessary or useful general rule”.237  For instance, the 
immediate consequence of assassination is the death of an individual, which is comparatively 
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insignificant, while the general consequence is the violation of the public authority, which is 
catastrophic. Allowing these actions to occur, like coining, forgery, sheep-stealing or horse-stealing, 
and house breaking, must introduce them “to all who act in the same manner, and from the said 
motive”, “which would soon fill the world with misery and confusion; and ere long put an end to 
human society, if not to the human species”. 238  Here, Paley emphasized the long-term 
consequences by which “the same sorts of actions” are “generally permitted or generally 
forbidden”.239  
Paley found the contemporary treatises of moral philosophy imperfect because they lacked 
general rules to calculate general consequences of actions. The works of Grotius and Puffendorff 
were “too much mixed up with civil law and with the jurisprudence of Germany, to answer precisely 
the design of a system of ethics—the direction of private consciences in the general conduct of 
human life”.240 For Paley, these moral rules were erroneous because these above mentioned 
moralists paid more attention to the relations of independent nations than to the correspondence 
of domestic life. Contemporary moral philosophy works abounded with classical quotations and 
ornaments of terms and phrases, and were consequently “not sufficiently adapted to real life and 
to actual situations”.241 Last but not least, for Paley, contemporary English ethicists falsely divorced 
the law of nature from the precepts of revelation.242 Thus, Paley in his letter written three years 
after the publication of the Principle regarded the principle of expedience as a hard and fast rule, 
applicable in all situations: 
I know nothing immutable in morals but their principle. That principle is public expediency, not 
a present temporary particular expediency but an expediency which comprehends all 
consequences which includes every tendency operation and every operation tendency by 
which in any way or at any distance of time human happiness may be affected by our conduct. 
Expediency so interpreted becomes the measure of our duty because it is the object upon to 
which the will of our supreme governor is constantly and uniformly directed. This principle is 
founded in our relation to him – like that relation is invariable. It travels unchanged thro’ every 
region of the earth & continues the same in every situation of our being. That which is 
expedient, expediency being well understood, is always right – so far morality is universal – 
but what is expedient; what conduct or what measure under given circumstances is entitled 
to that character becomes the subject of a calculation which must nececcarily [sic] be affected 
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by the previous situation the established habits customs disposition and manners of the 
persons upon whom our resolution is to operate. If these vary the result of the calculation will 
vary with them. If this variety follow the progress of climates I know not why we should deny 
that our duties moral rules must be adapted to the same temperature.243 
The declared aim of this paragraph is to assert that compared with other rules, the principle of 
expediency was the best one to attain the clearest knowledge of what people should do and to lay 
the surest foundation for human conduct. Before elaborating the principles of happiness and 
expediency in his moral philosophy, Paley invited his readers to consider the limitations of the 
different moral laws and instincts by which men tried to determine their duty in the eighteenth 
century.  
Let us begin with the law of honour. Paley’s definition of the law of honour was the rules of 
fashionable life.244 With regard to the inadequacies of the law of honour, Paley thought that it was 
not applicable to everyone in society. He thought the law of honour which was constituted by the 
will of the law-makers might be found easily to indulge in natural passions to pursue pleasures.245 
Paley explained the law of honour as the law that “only prescribes and regulates the duties betwixt 
equal; omitting such as relate to the Supreme Being, as well as those which we owe to our 
inferiors”.246 For Paley, the law of honour only regulated the etiquette and dealt with the affairs of 
particular classes in society. The social conventions varying on different social classes also revealed 
the inadequacy of the law of honour as an ideal moral guideline. For Paley, the law of honour easily 
wallowed in natural passions and worked only for certain classes in society. 
Paley moved on to argue the limitations of the law of the land to distinguish right and wrong. 
He viewed the law of the land as the civil law. For Paley, the law of the land labored under two 
defects. The law primarily commanded where it could compel. Consequently, its voluntary duties 
were out of the reach of its operation and power.247 The law of the land also failed to punish crimes 
when the circumstances which made the law changed or when the magistrate’s character 
changed.248 For Paley, the law of the land implied a strongly territorial jurisdiction which made this 
law neither constant nor universal. 
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In addition to his criticism of the laws of honour and the land, Paley held that the specificity 
of Scripture was limited. Although Scripture provided comprehensive guidance on ethical issues, it 
did not give specific directions and statements on every moral question.249 Paley mentioned that 
“Whoever expects to find in Scriptures a specific direction for every moral doubt that arises, looks 
for more than he will meet with”.250 Instead, Scripture preferred to lay down general rules and to 
illustrate them by examples.251 Besides, according to Paley, Scripture presupposed that its readers 
already had a knowledge of the principles of natural justice. The teachings of Scripture were not 
to present new rules of morality but to enforce the practice of morality by new sanctions and a 
greater certainty.252  Paley’s suggestion that “the Scriptures do not supersede the use of the 
science [moral philosophy] of which we profess to treat, and at the same time to acquit them of 
any charge of imperfection or insufficiency on that account” showed that he was not content with 
Scripture as sole basis for human conduct.253 
In addition to finding problems with the foregoing laws, Paley questioned the existence of 
an innate moral sense. A group of intellectuals of the eighteenth century viewed an innate moral 
sense as a criterion and motive for moral obligation.254 The most famous supporter of an innate 
moral sense in the eighteenth century was Antony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury. He 
helped establish what later was called as the “moral sense theory” or “aesthetic intuitionism”. 
Shaftesbury believed in a special moral faculty in human and defined it as “a real affection or love 
towards equity and right, for its own sake, and on the account of its own natural beauty and 
worth.”255 According to this definition, this faculty enabled people to distinguish rightness from 
wrongness in their thoughts and actions, which seemed like aesthetic appreciation or the sense of 
beauty. Shaftesbury’s understanding of an innate moral sense gave people ability to distinguish 
between the right and the wrong just as his sense of beauty gave him ability to pick out the ugly 
and the beautiful. In other words, Shaftesbury thought that the sense of right and wrong, same as 
the sense of beauty, was a fundamental faculty of human nature, and provided people an 
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instinctive ability to judge immediately the rightness and wrongness of a certain action and 
regulate their conduct. 
Although O’Flaherty holds that Paley’s idea of how to know moral obligation and duty was 
the converse of what Joseph Butler said in some ways, however, it was indeed part of Butler’s 
theory.256 Butler attempted to answer the question of how to know moral duty by stating that 
conscience was in accordance with the will of God. At the very start, Butler assumed the existence 
of a final cause. For him, it seemed certain that “There must be some movements of mind and 
heart which correspond to his perfections, or of which those perfections are the natural object”, 
or of which “that Image of God which was originally stamped upon” human nature. 257  This 
utterance implies a teleological end in human nature. He argued that if human nature was adjusted 
to a certain purpose, that was what it aimed for. Based on this premise, Butler reasoned that a 
person was capable of achieving his highest goal by complying with the purpose which is on the 
basis of his nature since a theological end presupposed that the author of nature made a person 
as he is under consideration.258 For Butler, the justification of this claim depended on a theological 
basis and it thus made the criterion of morality.  
Butler insisted that in essence an individual as a moral creature was a complex being of 
different hierarchical propensities. In the preface to his Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls 
Chapel (1726), he mentioned that in order to understand human inner nature, it was necessary to 
comprehend and consider it as a system, including not only its constituent parts, but also the 
relations between those parts, and between each part and the system.259 In his sense, these 
propensities must be a harmonious whole and be placed in a systematic relation of subordination. 
Every part must be in its proper proportion. According to their nature, the lower propensities were 
naturally subject to those which are more authoritative. For Butler, human nature regarded as a 
part of a systematic unity was in conformity with a final cause.  
On the nature of conscience, Butler insisted upon a half-way course between a wholly 
acquired moral constitution and Shaftesbury’s inborn intuitionism. Butler agreed with Shaftesbury 
that a moral sense or conscience was a special faculty. But Butler considered it more than just an 
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instinct. His teleological view of human nature embodied that the authority of conscience was the 
voice of God and not a merely personal statements of individual subjective wishes. Butler named 
conscience as a “principle of reflection”.260 Although Butler did not identify conscience as reason, 
it was not merely an instinct but presaged the nature of reason. As O’Flaherty concludes, according 
to Butler, “the virtuous life consisted in granting ‘absolute authority’ to the ‘superior principle’ of 
conscience”.261  
Based on the theory of Butler, Paley more radically rejected the theory of an innate moral 
sense. Paley regarded “the experience, or the reasoning of mankind” as a way of recommending 
the belief, as the basis of “the understandings and consciences of serious inquirers”, and as the 
path of “universal reception and authority”262. He then stated that after: 
Having experienced, in some instance, a particular conduct to be beneficial to ourselves, or 
observed that it would be so, a sentiment of approbation rises up in our minds; which 
sentiment afterwards accompanies the idea or mention of the same conduct, although the 
private advantage which first excited it no longer exist.263  
According to Paley, moral approbation of certain actions was followed by benefits and the 
sentiments triggered by such benefits in past experience. Even if such benefits faded away, such 
approbation fixed in mind.  
Paley held that moral approbation depended on the climate, local situations, fashions and 
institutions of a certain country, which “looks very little like the steady hand and indelible 
characters of Nature”.264 He used a wild boy or a savage without experience, without instruction, 
out of society, and out of the influence of authority, education or habit as an example to support 
his view that moral approbation or disapprobation was a result of social circumstances.265 Paley 
claimed that natural instincts did not exist as an innate moral sense, but were not different from 
prejudices and habits.266  
As O’Flaherty mentions, Paley’s point-blank suspicion and objection of the theory of an 
innate moral sense followed Lockean tradition that if people were given a moral instinct from God, 
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they would share and insist on the same moral values.267. In order to make instincts intelligible, 
Paley argued that a clear and precise idea of an object must had been implanted together with an 
instinct.268 This instinct and idea of the object were inseparable and accompanied each other even 
in the imagination, which is appropriate for all correlative ideas. 269  More prosaically, before 
people approved a certain action by nature, they must have received from nature a distinct 
conception of the action that they are later prompted to approve.270 Paley was sure that people 
had never received such a conception.  
In order to explain his “objection to the system of moral instincts”, Paley denied the 
existence of the uniformity of moral approbations.271 He said that “there is scarcely a single vice 
which, in some age or country of the world, has not been countenanced by public opinion.”272 In 
order to support this view, he discussed that in some lands the responsibility of children was to 
care their aged parents while in others no such obligation existed.273 He also noted that the views 
of suicide changed with times and trends.274 The regulations and censures of all civilized nations 
were not the same, and were still different from the savages of the tropical regions or wild 
America.275 Thus, Paley concluded that “there are no maxims in the science which can well be 
deemed innate, as none perhaps can be assigned, which are absolutely and universally true; in 
other words, which do not bend to circumstances”. 276 On this account, Paley held that “it is not a 
safe way of arguing, to assume certain principles as so many dictates, impulses, and instincts of 
nature, and then to draw conclusions from these principles, as to the rectitude or wrongness of 
actions, independent of the tendency of such actions, or of any other consideration whatever”.277 
For Paley, the theory of an innate moral sense was not a firm foundation for moral reasoning. 
In his Principles, Paley confessed that he was to “resort to a rule and a motive ulterior to 
the instincts themselves”.278 For him, moral codes derived from “prejudices and habits” had no 
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practical value in the progress of morals. Instead, such public affections always existed side by side 
with conventional and current norms, but never corrected them.279 Paley wondered which system 
of morals could fulfill this mission, and asserted that it was utility that could provide an objective 
principle by which all moral customs and norms could be judged, evaluated and possibly improved. 
According to Paley, people must act on a general principle of expediency because they were largely 
creatures of prejudices and habits. Therefore, the next section will move on to discuss that Paley 
turned his attention to look for “a surer road” to determine of the divine will.280 
 
2. The Principle of Happiness 
Since Paley considered the foregoing laws and instincts as inadequate motives for his moral 
philosophy, he recognized that it was necessary to find a general motive which could be applied to 
everyone. In this section, I move on to argue that Paley regarded happiness as a motive of human 
actions, that is to say, the reason why human is called human was not an innate moral sense but 
the ability learned from his society to judge what is good for him and to regulate his moral conduct. 
In LeMahieu’s words, “Paley argued that man’s basic instinct was to seek pleasure and to avoid 
pain”.281 
Since Paley rejected an innate moral sense as a motive and guide for moral behaviour, a 
question then arose: why is a person obliged to act morally?282 For Paley, “a man is said to be 
obliged, when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another.”283 The first 
key point of this axiom is that the motive of moral obligation must be violent.284 For Paley, if a 
person who is another one’s benefactor, asked the latter one to vote for him, the latter one was 
obliged to vote to do so. The motive of this action was not out of gratitude or exception but out of 
a violent motive.285 This leads to the second elements of moral obligation that it must be result 
from the command of another.286 From this, Paley answered the question of moral obligation that 
“wherever the motive is violent enough, and coupled with the idea of command, authority, law, or 
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the will of a superior, there, I take it, we always reckon ourselves to be obliged.”287 Paley contended 
that a person should not be obliged to obey the laws, the magistrate, even or the commands of 
God, except he could gain rewards and pleasures following his obedience.288 This answer draws 
forth the fundamental principle of Paley’s moral philosophy: private happiness is the motive of 
moral behaviour, and the will of God is the rule.289 
Paley was not the first moral philosopher to use the relationship between pleasure and 
happiness to understand human bebaviour. John Gay, whose “Preliminary Dissertation”, translated 
by Edmund Law, had a vital influence on Paley,290 used an example of “money and happiness” to 
explain that the approbation or disapprobation of moral virtues was a matter of impulse.291 Gay 
stated that the desire and endeavor to gain money was due to the perception of happiness that 
money would bring. When observing the action of obtaining money promoted human private 
happiness, Gay held that people attached pleasure to this action. Eventually such action became 
inextricably fixed in mind through association with an idea of enjoyment. For Gay, people were not 
born with an instinct of love for money but developed a love of money. The happiness or misery 
“that which was first pursued only as a Means” turned into “a real End”.292 Moreover, what cannot 
be ignored is that many of these associations were gradually accumulated by a way of imitation.293 
Gay concluded that “I deny that this moral sense, or these public affections are innate or implanted 
in us; they are acquired either from our own observation or the imitation of others”.294 
Gay acknowledged that people’s approbation and disapprobation of moral actions could be 
attributed to Lockean theory of the association of ideas instead of innate or implanted instincts. 
More specifically, Gay hypothesized that “the principle of all action” was rooted in the rational 
calculation of self-interest, which was ultimately originated from the pursuit of pleasure and 
avoidance of pain.295 Such actions were gradually apprehended in the imagination, and eventually 
the approbation or disapprobation of them was spontaneous without any consideration of self-
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interest and private happiness. For Gay, moral approbation was a way of encouraging men to 
pursue and promote pleasure annexed to a certain action.  
Paley agreed with Hume’s view of habits and placed great emphasis on the value of 
psychological associative operation in the regulation of human conduct in the Principles. In Treatise 
on Human Nature (1739-1740), Hume gave a clear and concise explanation about this psychological 
process by which habits are formed, reinforced and strengthened constantly, frequently and 
repeatedly: 
As the habit, which produces the association, arises from the frequent conjunction of objects, 
it must arrive at its perfection by degrees, and must acquire new force from each instance, 
that falls under our observation. The first instance has little or no force; The second makes 
some addition to it; The third becomes still more sensible; and ‘tis by these slow steps, that 
our judgement arrives at a full assurance.296  
Hume explained in detail how mind formed habits on the basis of the frequent repetitions of this 
psychological enhancement. The formation of certain habits only depended on the number of the 
psychological repetitions. He held that “every past experiment has the same weight and that ’tis 
only a superior number of them, which can throw the balance on any side.”297 The psychological 
assent rested merely on the number of experience and was definitely indifferent to which they 
responded to. In this sense, custom and education could also produce the same effect of mind due 
to frequent and prolonged repetitions.298 Hume took a skeptical attitude to the ultimate validity 
of belief reproduced through the associative operations of mind, however, he accepted its practical 
necessity and regraded it as a standard of rational belief. For Hume, “habits may not be strictly 
rational, but it is exact.”299 The mental process of association could be operated reasonably by a 
habitual connection.300 
In Paley’s sense, forming a habit of approving was influenced by the principle of authority, 
by the principle of imitation and by the inculcation in early youth.301 These effects usually came 
“from censure and encouragement, from the books one read, the conversations one hear, the 
current application of epithets, the general turn of language”. 302  Thus, Paley concluded that 
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“moral approbation follows the fashions and institutions of the country we live in; which fashions 
also and institutions themselves have grown out of the exigencies, the climate, situation, or local 
circumstances of the country”.303 In short, Paley held that moral approbation or disapprobation of 
certain actions was a programme of psychological instruction of the impacts constituted by all 
members of society.  
Paley posed a question that if a man’s conduct is determined by his social circumstances, 
then what is his own moral responsibility. For Paley, a man’s moral responsibility resided in “the 
forming and contracting of these habits”.304 As he wrote, “Man is a bundle of habits”.305 Paley 
believed that most actions were to be done solely for the sake of habit. His moral teaching aimed 
to persuade people to consider the good of humankind as the subject, the will of God as the rule, 
and everlasting happiness as the motive of all virtue.306 For Paley, this would happen just because 
people consciously trained certain actions accompanying sentiments in a long time by the desire 
to do the will of God, or to attain everlasting happiness, or to contribute to the good of mankind. 
When these principles have been strengthened and consolidated into a pattern of conduct, people 
could act without keeping these principles in mind. As Paley concluded, “whatever is made habitual, 
becomes smooth, and easy, and nearly indifferent”.307 
On this point, it is worth noting that Abraham Tucker’s The Light of Nature Pursued which 
was the only one work commended in the preface of the Principles, had a remarkable influence on 
Paley’s moral thought of habit.308 According to Tucker, by focusing consciously their attention on 
certain motives rather than others, people could better command their organs of sensation and 
reflection.309 Tucker emphasized on “the desire of retraining desire”.310 For him, the scope for 
moral choice laid in human power of “raising up ideas or fixing them in mind, which shall determine 
us to such volitions as we want”.311 Tucker held that any moral rule which wants to have an effect 
on behaviour needed to remain in mind by becoming “habitual, and striking with the force of an 
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obligation or an object of desire”.312 Like Gay, Tucker and Paley were also passionate about the 
principle of association. But more importantly, the latter two raised association to the level of 
practice because they held that the chief goal of moralists was to make affections habitual.313 
Paley mentioned that habits were formed through experience. People developed a habit of 
praising or condemning certain types of behaviour by the reinforcement of the feelings of pleasure 
and pain. When they found a particular conduct to be beneficial to themselves, a sentiment of 
approbation of this conduct rose up in their minds and accompanied afterwards the idea of the 
same conduct, although the private advantages which first stirred up the sentiment no longer 
existed.314 For Paley, a servant could serve a master well without realizing the latter’s will or 
interest, as the virtue and merit consisted in the formation of these service over time under the 
direction of dutiful motives.315 That is why it is important to discuss Paley’s view of happiness 
which is stimulus of habitual formation. 
Paley emphasized the cognitive nature of happiness. In a long note, he mentioned that “I 
should take it to denote a certain state of the nervous system in that part of the human frame in 
which we feel joy and grief, passions and affections” 316 . Then Paley explained each painful 
sensation could not only violently influence and derange the nervous system but also at length 
produce a perpetual irritation, which would be showed as the feelings of fretfulness, impatience, 
and restlessness.317 In the same way, pleasurable sensations might have such an effect upon the 
nervous system. Such effect might return into their place and order, and thereby recover, or it might 
preserve as harmonious feelings like the sense of complacency and satisfaction. 318  Paley 
maintained that happiness did not refer to any particular enjoyment or any gratification of the 
senses but to the secondary effect which such enjoyments and gratifications produce upon the 
nervous system.319 
At first glance, Paley’s definition of happiness might be quantitative. He said that “In 
strictness, any condition may be denominated happy, in which the amount or aggregate of pleasure 
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exceeds that of pain; and the degree of happiness depends upon the quantity of this excess.”320 
Happiness in this passage was defined simply as “the greatest quantity of it ordinarily attainable in 
human life.”321 O’Flaherty summarizes Paley’s definition of happiness that “the bigger the surplus, 
the happier the person”.322 At this point, Clarke argues that Paley did not attempt to distinguish 
between the qualities of happiness.323 Similar to Clarke, Rosen avers that Paley had no intention 
to classify different classes of pleasures and pains. 324  For example, health, one of the four 
components of Paley’s happiness, was an enjoyment which is common to “infants and brutes, 
especially of the lower and sedentary orders of animals, as of oysters, periwinkles, and the like.”325 
Paley seemed to be suggesting that he was indifferent to the different qualitative classes of 
pleasures and pains. 
Paley did not differentiate between the spiritual happiness and the physical one, however, 
he held that pleasures differ in nothing but in continuance and intensity.326 As Paley explained, 
“the alacrity and spirits of men who are engaged in any pursuit that interests them, with the 
dejection and ennui of, almost all, who are either born to so much that they want nothing more, 
or who have used up their satisfactions too soon, and drained the sources of them”. 327  His 
understanding of happiness showed a qualitative emphasis on continuance and endurance. Paley 
explicitly denied that happiness consisted in the pleasures of sense, for “computing strictly the 
actual sensation, we shall be surprised to find how inconsiderable a portion of our time they 
occupy”.328 For Paley, the reason why sensual pleasures were not parts of human happiness was 
because of either their short duration or the loss of the relish by repetition.329 The frequent 
repetition of cognitive enhancement reinforced Paley’s emphasis on the quality of the endurance 
of happiness.  
Paley valued actions by whether it could produce a steady stream of pleasures over a long 
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period of time.330 Paley’s discussion of happiness consisted firstly in the exercise of social and 
domestic affections.331 In his view, exercising social affections was oriented to good spirits and 
mental tranquility.332 And Paley attached importance to health as another source of pleasure.333 
He considered health as “freedom from bodily distempers, as that tranquility, firmness, and alacrity 
of mind, which we call good spirit.” 334  In this sense, social affections and health were two 
necessary elements of happiness because they made sure that people kept away from lucrative 
situation, favorite indulgences, intemperate passions, and tedious regimens.335 For Paley, social 
affections and health both were the basis and prerequisite for other lasting happiness.336 
More importantly, happiness consisted in engagement, defined as “ the exercise of our 
faculties either of body or of mind in the pursuit of some engaging end”.337 Paley held that present 
gratifications could make the possessor happy only as he had something in reserve—something to 
hope for and look forward to. 338  People chose their ends wisely, and then commanded the 
imagination to find happiness in the means; after this, the ends might be forgotten.339 For Paley, 
happiness was almost similar to the wise selection of enjoyments. He thought that these pleasures 
had the greatest value because people had a profound goal and a perpetual engagement for life.340 
For him, hope was the most important pleasure for human happiness because it drove engagement 
and activity. In this sense, “engagement is everything.”341 
Paley’s view that happiness relied on the prudent contribution of habits annexed to his idea 
of engagement.342 He explained that to a large degree the secret of human happiness was to set 
habits in this way that every change is better than the former one. Paley’s analogy was that it is 
not the income which a man possesses but the augment of income that gave happiness. Thus, 
Paley assured his readers that “the method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by 
the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of the action to promote or diminish the general 
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happiness.”343  Here, Paley reiterated the most important question of happiness was not the 
definition of it, but its practical significance and value on how to maximise the amount of pleasures 
in human affairs. 
Paley’s view of engagement was in many respects similar to Tucker. Tucker put forward the 
idea of “the aggregate of satisfactions” which is a progress made of a long-term goal and a 
resolution to purse it.344 For Tucker, this process not only included the happiness of the final reward 
but also implied regular and steady repetition of engagements which provided peace habitual to 
mind. On the one hand, Tucker insisted that engagements enabled people to achieve their 
desirable objectives by effectively sustained means. In terms of theological utilitarianism, Tucker 
held that the primary and proper role of moralists was to nurture and facilitate a steady stream of 
engagements of the pursuit of God’s will from this earthy world to a blissful afterlife.345 This idea 
was very similar to Paley’s definition of engagement. 
On the other hand, Tucker gave an example of the musical novice to expound the 
relationship between temporary pain and final happiness. The novice always practiced with pain 
at first, however, he could associate notes with the keys of the instruments and their sounds in the 
imagination after several regular practice. By habitually repeating the types of action 
recommended by reason, he could associate temporary painful practice with long-term happiness 
and ultimate good, which could render he pleasant in the course of learning.346  For Tucker, 
although the process of the pursuit of goals was not always pleasurable, the preparatory and 
temporary pain ultimately led to the final prize. 
Paley’s view of the problem of evil was in many ways similar to Tucker’s discussion of the 
relationship between temporary pain and final goals. On the chapter “the Divine Benevolence” in 
the Principles and latter in Natural Theology, Paley had to face the question of the origin of evil. 
He took the same measures as Tucker did to turn this question to a matter of explaining how evil 
was eventually necessary to human happiness. Physical pain was an alarm of bodily health, and 
facilitated the formation and development of salutary habits.347 Paley concluded that “a world 
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furnished with advantages on one side, and beset with difficulties, wants, and inconveniences on 
the other, is the proper abode of free, rational and active natures, being the fittest to stimulate 
and exercise their faculties”.348 In this sense, evil was the mother of engagement. Paley, following 
Tucker, insisted that a ruling passion provided mind with a constant source of engagement. 
Paley’s principle of happiness was concerned with the steady and perpetual regulation and 
constancy of passions. His definition of happiness including the pursuit of engaging ends embodies 
his rejection of the previous and conventional measurement and classification of happiness. As 
Hirschman explains, “it advocated in the injection of an element of calculating efficiency, as well as 
of prudency, into human behavior”, and “that one set of passions, hitherto known variously as 
greed, avarice, or love of lucre, could be usefully employed to oppose and bridle such other 
passions as ambition, lust for power, or sexual lust”.349 Paley’s satisfaction of some passions over 
others was not determined by the superiority of intellectual over sensual pleasures, but only by 
duration and intensity of pleasures. The pursuit of happiness and the avoidance of pain indicated 
a calculation of pleasure over pain. The next section will expound that how Paley transformed this 
calculation into a practical ethics, just as his epigram said: “Whatever is expedient, is right”.350 
 
3. The Principle of Expediency 
In this section, I argue that Paley viewed the principle of expediency as remedy for the 
shortcomings of moral philosophy in his time. Paley intended to look for a sufficiently clear and 
comprehensive principle to judge and direct actions in the realm of morality. For Paley, the 
principle of expediency was regarded as such an effective guide to human moral actions, because 
virtuous self-interest was supposed to be predictable and constant.351 According to the doctrine 
of “interest will not lie”, Hirschman explains that during Paley’s day some thinkers thought that 
interests would become transparent and predictable. 352  In that time, the qualities such as 
constancy and stability derived from predictability, implied a reasonable basis for the moral 
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conduct of “rational individuals”.353 Seventeenth-century moralists such as Joseph Butler, John Gay, 
Edmund Law and Abraham Tucker who had a heavy influence on Paley reconciled the inevitably 
imperfection of human knowledge with the rational base of beliefs in accordance to practical 
aspects of daily life.354 They combined self-interest as expectation and Christian apologetics, and 
stated Christianity would promise maximum expectation of virtuous self-interest.355 Paley and 
these moralists contributed to the rise and development of Christian utilitarianism.  
Butler gave the framework and blueprint of theological utilitarianism. He argued that 
“mankind is appointed to live in a future state; that there everyone shall be rewarded or 
punished; …… that our present life is a probation, a state of trial, and of discipline, for that future 
one”.356  Butler’s view delineated three pillars of theological utilitarianism: this life as a trial, 
sanctions in the future life, and a practical guide for present life from Christianity. In short, human 
welfare after death provided all rational people with sufficient high expectation which could be 
operated in this life. 
According to Butler’s three pillars, theological utilitarians were to consider how to produce 
the utmost happiness within the province of reason. If the will of God was the rule of virtue, then 
it still needed to answer what was he commanded. As far as Gay concerned, the pursuing of 
happiness was consistent with the design of God. As mentioned in the last section, Gay argued that 
the approbation of certain moral actions was not due to an instinct implanted by God but was 
“finally resolvable into Reason pointing out private Happiness”.357 For Gay, the plentiful goodness 
of God’s works evidenced the rectitude of the pursuing of happiness, which plainly demonstrated 
that “that he [God] could have no other design in creating Mankind than their Happiness”.358 In 
this sense, a morally good action, according to the will of God, promoted a degree of human 
happiness.  
There were some situations in which the good of virtue might be contrary to private 
happiness, however, Gay argued that it was necessary to identify inferior and ultimate happiness. 
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As one approved of his fellows’ happiness, he also took advantages from it. This kind of behaviour 
sometimes seemed to conflict with his temporary interest and pleasure, but was good for his 
general well-being. Such actions that benefit people in a long term were the source of and motive 
for public affection.359 For Gay, since the pursuit of happiness was the principle of all actions, the 
merit of an action must concern its ultimate end.  
Gay’s effort to establish the necessity of divine sanctions and public welfare was a starting 
point and developed by Edmund Law. In his Religion and Morality which was annexed to the fourth 
edition of King’s Origin of Evil (1758), he was aimed at solving the theological weakness of Gay’s 
work. Based on Gay’s two arguments that human happiness relied on the design of God, and that 
people generally were concerned for their welfare in the afterlife, Law bought eternal rewards and 
punishments to moral obligation. In his view, the most of human happiness was related to the life 
to come, and this fact more greatly explained why people are obliged “to an action when we can 
see no further Reason for it”.360 As far as Gay was concerned, if actions were concerned for the 
good of humankind, then they would be morally good. However, according to Law, an action was 
good only if it complied with the will of God. There must be a “eternal and immutable Reason” 
assured by God to oblige men to perform selfless actions, because private happiness promoted 
selfish affections and actions to a greater extent. By putting the divine will over expedient actions, 
Law tied moral actions and religious duties together. 
Gay and Law paved a path for future construction of a workably theological utilitarian 
practical code of ethics. By throwing supernatural rewards and punishments into moral obligation, 
they enlarged the scope of human happiness. On the one hand, the calculations of utility divorced 
Christian passions from enthusiasm. On the other hand, Gay and Law believed that benevolent 
affections could bring about selfless or at least not immediately self-interested actions. In all, Gay 
and Law’s insistence on eternal sanctions laid a solid foundation for Christian moral code which 
was Paley’s biggest concern and his greatest contribution.  
Tucker accepted Law’s judgment that it was possible to make God’s will the guiding principle 
of all actions. Firstly, Tucker confirmed that self-interest was the only reason for the approbation 
of any moral action. For him, “Temporal interests” were “our surest mark to guide us in securing 
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our future hopes”.361 Furthermore, Tucker still held that ethics without religious sanctions was 
insufficient since the absolute necessity of religion made the system of morality complete. Since 
“Self lies at the bottom of every action we do the love of God, to be sincere and . . . vigorous, must 
spring from a settled opinion of his goodness and beneficence, and that every act of conformity to 
his will is beneficial to the performer”, Tucker implied that acting according to God’s will was a kind 
of more rational calculations and produced more happiness than others.362 Religion was “the 
science of attaining happiness”, and human life was a ceaseless pursuit of happiness.363 In this way,  
Tucker blended the goal of ethics and faith together in the theological utilitarian frame, which could 
be adopted as a way of life. Tucker’s practical value on people’s concern both for this world and 
the afterlife had a profound effect on Paley.  
As mentioned in the last section, Paley regarded self-interest as “the mainspring of human 
action”364. Paley’s definition of virtue was “the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of 
God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness”. His definition revealed his heritage in theological 
utilitarianism.365 It made “the good of mankind” the subject, “the will of God” the rule, and 
“everlasting happiness” the motive of human virtue.366 The subject, rule and motive went to the 
same destination that God wishes for human happiness. Because God wishes and wills human 
happiness, people should strive to promote their own welfare. Humankind’s basic preference to 
seek pleasure and to avoid pain was harmonious with the will of God, which was the essential 
element of Paley’s principle of expediency. 
Paley put the belief in an afterlife at the heart of his moral philosophy. After establishing 
happiness as the motive of human conduct, Paley turned to answer a question why people are 
obliged to keep their words, by saying “because I am urged to do so by a violent motive namely, 
the expectation of being after this life rewarded, if I do, or punished for it, if I do not, resulting from 
the command of another, namely, of God”.367 Paley strove to tie moral obligation in this life with 
heavenly sanctions. If the motive behind morality was personal happiness, then a person should 
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take account of his happiness in the next world as well as in this one. Paley relied heavily upon the 
doctrine of rewards and punishments in eternity and thus offered a strong theological sanction to 
his moral system. For him, earthly life was only a probation and human conduct should be 
considered in the context of eternity. Self-interest in the context of eternity did not merely mean 
the pursuit of worldly happiness, instead, Paley emphasized that the happiness of the next world 
should be the greatest self-interest. 
Based on his eschatology, Paley found the final solution of questions of moral obligation, 
that is “private happiness is our motive, and the will of God our rule”.368 People were under 
obligation to do something because their welfare relied on their master’s will. For Paley, the master 
was the master because he had the power to reward and punish. Thus, Paley confirmed “that moral 
obligation is like all other obligations” which are “from the command of another”, and that “we 
consider solely what we ourselves shall gain or lose by the act”.369 People must keep their word 
because God commands it. The motive was eternal rewards and punishments in an afterlife. In 
short, “we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come”.370 
In Paley’s view, morality was still a matter of rational calculation. Paley held that those 
actions which are in harmony with the will of God would be rewarded and those which are out of 
harmony with the will of God would be punished. He held that “There are prepared for us rewards 
and punishments, of all possible degrees, from the most exalted happiness down to extreme 
misery; so that ‘our labour is never in vain’; whatever advancement we make in virtue, we procure 
a proportionable accession of future happiness.” 371 Paley was even more radical in the Principles, 
and he argued that earthly ambitions were less productive of morally good actions than heavenly 
rewards and punishments. “They who would establish a system of morality, independent of a 
future state, must look out for some different idea of moral obligation”.372 According to utilitarian 
calculations, Paley firmly believed that human happiness in the next world gave the maximum of 
self-interest. 
Like many moral philosophy books published in the late eighteenth century, Paley’s 
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theological utilitarianism needed to address several issues raised by David Hume’s An Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). Hume held that human sentiment was a sufficient 
motive enough for selfless actions. He mentioned “that everything, which contributes to the 
happiness of society, recommends itself to our approbation”. 373  In other words, behaviour 
conforming to social virtues recommend itself only because of their “immediate accord or 
agreement with human sentiment” and “the immediate satisfaction it conveys”, this is to say, its 
own utility.374 The pleasure or pain of certain moral actions was an end in itself. For Hume, the 
immediate inducements that such actions conveyed were sufficient for human conduct, and 
therefore such actions acquired their existence from their utility. 
Paley attached special attention to Hume’s complaint “of the modern scheme of uniting 
Ethics with the Christian Theology” in the Principles.375 Paley pointed out that human sentiments 
without religious sanctions were insufficient for morality. In order to counter Hume, Paley invited 
his readers to pay close attention to the second part of the ninth section of the Enquiry. Paley noted 
that because the passion, such as lust, revenge, envy, ambition and avarice, impressed 
continuously stronger influence on human minds, readers should acknowledge the necessity of 
additional sanctions beyond earthly incentives.376 He pointed out that such sanctions existed in 
the form of the rewards and punishments from Christian Religion.377 For Paley, though everyone 
was motived by earthly and individual inducements, he still had a serious concern about his fate in 
an afterlife. As mentioned in last chapter, Paley’s Evidences demonstrated and proved the existence 
and veracity of Christian miracles and sanctions and he took this demonstration as a given in the 
Principles. In Paley’s view, it would be foolish to separate morality from Christianity. 
In response to Hume’s sceptical interrogation of the effectiveness of next-life ambitions as 
moral motives, Paley observed how Christian belief had become an integral part of human daily 
life. He explained charity which is a distinctively Christian virtue with emphasis. He applied charity 
“in a sense more commodious to my purpose, to signify the promoting the happiness of our 
inferiors”.378 Paley stated that superiors’ obligation to their inferiors was much greater than their 
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inferiors to them because the inferiors’ industry and labour supplied and served the superiors’ 
necessities of life.379 As to the current issue of slavery, Paley held that although Christianity could 
only indirectly alleviate the cruelty of slavery, it indeed soften the hardness of the civil institutions 
of slavery. With the advent of Christianity, there was a spirit of liberality which slowly but gradually 
transformed the nature of master-servant relations in Christian nations, even though Christ kept 
silent in Scripture. 380  Paley foresaw optimistically that with the spread of Christianity such 
transformation would inevitably break the institution of slavery down.381 Here, Paley presented 
the power of Christianity as a softener of men’s hearts and concluded that divine sanctions were 
the cornerstone of moral codes: 
Charity, in this sense, I take to be the principal province of virtue and religion: for, whilst worldly 
prudence will direct our behavior towards our superiors, and politeness towards our equals, 
there is little beside the consideration of duty, or an habitual humanity which comes into the 
place of consideration, to produce a proper conduct towards those who are beneath us, and 
dependant upon us.382 
Obviously, charity was seen by Paley as the remedy for the law of honour. The law of honour, 
was a “capricious rule” “constituted by men occupied in the pursuit of pleasure” “to the licentious 
indulgence of the natural passions”.383 As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, for Paley, 
the law of honour only worked between equals and ignored the higher order’s treatment of the 
lower orders. However, as mentioned in the last paragraph, Christian charity insisted on the 
reciprocal duties of people at different levels of society, therefore, instilled a strong sense that all 
people are equal before God. In Paley’s view, the charitable behaviour associated with divine 
sanctions could remedy the limitations of the short-term and temporal pleasures of the law of 
honour. In short, Christianity could compensate for the shortcomings of customary morality. 
Paley’s definition of charity showed the mutual dependency and common progress of 
humankind. As Harrison explains, the institutionalization of “a charity” from the seventeenth 
century onwards was the very embodiment of the relief and care of human estate. The primary 
focus of charity in this period shifted from the preeminent theological virtue to the performance 
of duties toward others.384  Charity, therefore, was understood by Paley as relative duties to 
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promote the welfare of the inferiors in society in some material way, and to increase ultimately the 
total sum of the material welfare of the whole society. Moralists like Paley regarded themselves as 
participants in a providential plan to establish general charity based on self-interest. This was a 
thoroughly theological utilitarian reformation. 
After Paley published the Principles, his critics said that he placed the doctrine of 
expediency above the authority of Scripture. In the early nineteenth century, Adam Sedgwick 
complained that theological utilitarianism was too deeply “in bondage to the world, measuring 
every act by a worldly standard, and estimating its value by worldly standards”.385 Later in the 
nineteenth century, Leslie Stephen surmised that Paley’s moral philosophy was merely “flimsy 
theological disguises”.386 In the twentieth century, M. L. Clarke believed that Paley’s ethics was 
“too much based on the values of this world”.387 Generally, these critics argued that, for Paley, 
human conduct originated in motives of personal expediency, and from the calculations of 
individual loss or gain. However, the foregoing thinkers underplayed the fact that Paley thought 
that it was necessary to apply the doctrine of expediency only where Scripture did not give a 
specific and detailed statement. For Paley, Scripture declared such general rules as “worshipping 
God in spirit and in truth; doing as we would be done by; loving our neighbour as ourself; forgiving 
others, as we expect forgiveness from God”388. But Scripture did not define the criterion of how to 
love our neighbor and how to forgive others. It was in this lacuna that the doctrine of expediency 
provided an objective principle to practice the general rules laid down on Scripture. Indeed, Paley 
held that what Scripture said was final but that it was not adequate enough as a system of morality. 
Where Hume asserted that morality necessarily suffered when wedded to religion, Paley placed a 
higher value on religious over secular moral codes, on theological utilitarianism over other moral 
codes. 
Paley thought of the principle of expediency as a remedy for the failings of moral philosophy 
in his time. His philosophical method of discerning the will of God through the principle of 
expediency revealed that a system of rewards and punishments after death was a part of his moral 
philosophy. Paley believed that the enjoyments of engagement were not limited to immediate 
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rewards. This concern not only gave a temporal vitality, but also provided profound ends of life, 
extending to the next world, which was strongly associated with his analysis of human happiness. 
Paley concluded that “let the sanctions of Christianity never be forgotten; by which it will be shown 
that they give strength and lustre to each other: religion will appear to be the voice of reason, and 
morality will be the will of God”.389 Although Paley held that the doctrine of expediency was the 
supreme guide of his moral philosophy, he still bore in mind that Christianity offered eternal 
rewards and punishments as religious sanctions.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that the principle of expediency underpinned many of the positions 
Paley offered in his Principles. His contemporary moralists attempted to establish certain moral 
rules to serve as landmarks to help human’s focus on their ultimate good constantly and continually, 
and work these into a system. The aim of these moralists was to encourage their audience to keep 
such rules as good in mind, and turn them into the principles of conduct. In this setting, John Gay, 
Edmund Law and Abraham Tucker chose private happiness as probabilistic expectation and put in 
Christianity as religious sanctions in eternity. Their thoughts about theological utilitarianism set up 
the foundation for Paley’s moral philosophy in Principles. After solving the problems that he saw 
in the law of honour, the law of the land, Scripture and an innate moral sense, Paley affirmed boldly 
that it was a theologically grounded principle of expedience alone which could constitute moral 
obligation and direct behaviour in a sufficiently clear and comprehensive manner. 
Paley’s ideas contributed significantly to the development of a programme of moral 
instruction based on the principle of happiness, which extended Gay’s “Preliminary Dissertation” 
and Law’s “On Morality and Religion”. Although Gay and Law were pioneers of theological 
utilitarianism, they had said little about its practical application. By accepting the metaphysical 
framework laid by Gay and Law, Paley focused on the practical task of the cultivation of virtuous 
habits in the Principles. It not only trained men to habitually take the long-term consequences of 
particular actions into account more seriously than the immediate consequences of them. But 
more importantly, it gave impetus to the ongoing pursuit of human happiness in this life and the 
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next. Paley had very high esteem for his excellence in illuminating some fundamental issues of 
eighteenth-century moral philosophy, such as human psychology and the formation of habit. And 







Logic, Argumentation and Moral Knowledge 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I argue that Paley used a synthetic method of argumentation in the 
Principles. The decline of deductive demonstration and the development of probability theory also 
manifested a methodological problem that how intellectuals of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries dealt with the problems of language and communication. Logic that used to be thought 
to yield demonstrative knowledge started to entrench in the world of facts and common 
experience which was traditionally the realm of rhetoric. Syllogisms with universal premises and 
conclusions gave way to a new kind of argumentation and communication which was appropriate 
for the new forms of evidence and knowledge. To expound how Paley captured and transmitted 
his moral knowledge to students, namely, his synthetic pedagogics in the Principles, Section 1 
explains the theories of logic in the late seventeenth and most of the eighteenth centuries. This 
theory followed the previous tradition, dividing the subjects into four parts: ideas, judgement, 
reasoning, and method, and emphasizing the function of discovery as well as communication. 
Section 2 moves on to introduce that following Locke and the latitudinarians, Paley showed his 
distaste for syllogism and preference for a plain writing style in the Principles. In Section 3, two 
types of methods of argumentation of eighteenth-century logic will be introduced: analysis and 
synthesis, as well as their different functions: investigation and communication respectively. Since 
syllogism could no longer satisfy the communicative function of eighteenth-century logic, which 
aimed to delivery knowledge easily, quickly, clearly and accurately, synthesis rather than analysis 
was regarded as a more convenient method in the field of education. Finally, Section 4 gives a 
detailed explanation that Paley used a synthetic method to convey moral knowledge to his young 
students. The Principles is an eighteenth-century example to reveal the function of synthesis in 
instruction and exposition. 
 
1. The Theories of Eighteenth-Century Logic 
In this section, I mainly introduce the theories of logic in the eighteenth century. The major 
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logical works in England during the late seventeenth and most of the eighteenth centuries 
consciously followed the Port-Royal Logick of the preceding century. Their subject was 
quadripartite, namely, ideas, judgment, reasoning, and method. This division particularly found 
expression in textbooks like Jean Pierre de Crousaz’s A New Treatise of the Art of Thinking (1724), 
Isaac Watts’ Logick (1725), William Duncan’s The Elements of Logick (1748), George Campbell’s The 
Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), Joseph Priestley’s A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism 
(1777) and Hugh Blair’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1778).390 
In Art of Thinking which was published in English and widely read by the contemporaries of 
the eighteenth century, Jean-Pierre de Crousaz defined logic as “a system of such principles, 
observations, and maxims, as are able to furnish the human understanding with a greater degree 
of penetration, force, extent, exactness, and readiness either to discover truth of it self, or to 
comprehend it to them in its turn upon its own discovery”.391 In order to detail and systematize 
this general definition, Crousaz divided logic according to four basic operations of human mind. 
Crousaz held that “In the first Place are form’d our Perceptions, that are called Simple, 
because they are only the Representation of Objects, without determining any thing about them, 
either affirmatively or negatively.”392 The theory of perception, as Crousaz understood it, involved 
sensations and ideas of objects. A sensation was a perception “which perceives themselves simply 
as they are”.393 For example, if one had a representation and recollection of an object, such as a 
tree, the sun, or a triangle, or if one had an emotional and sensory experience, such as thirst, pain, 
sorrow or desire, one had a perception.394 In other words, a sensation was a perception which has 
nothing apart from itself.  
An idea, however, was a perception which has an object different from itself.395 If one saw 
a tree or a triangle, in the examples above, one was not only presented with a tree or a triangle 
 
390 The reason I choose these works as typical examples of eighteenth-century logic is that Dr. Samuel Johnson 
mentioned them in the preface of Robert Dodsley’s The Preceptor which Paley highlighted in the preface of his 
Principles (see the Principles, p. xxxvi). Dr. Johnson recommended reader the study of Crousaz, Watts and Locke’ 
Essay if they needed further help in logic in addition to William Duncan’s The Elements of Logick, since The Preceptor 
already contained it. See Wilbur Samuel Howell, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), 307. 
391 Jean-Pierre de Crousaz, A New Treatise of the Art of Thinking; or, a Compleat System of Reflections, Concerning 
the Conduct and Improvement of the Mind, 2 vols. (London, 1724). vol. 1, 2. 
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394 Crousaz (1724), vol. 1, 2, 10. 
395 Crousaz, (1724), vol. 1, 10. 
68 
 
but also the names of objects of trees or triangles.396 An idea was a perception representing things 
beyond itself. By sensations, people only knew their own conditions; by ideas, people were able to 
be acquainted with the conditions of things by which they could discover nature.397 Crousaz 
summarized, “in order therefore to understand the Things which exist without us, we must consult 
our Ideas, rather than our Sensations”.398  
With respect to the second part of logic, Crousaz held that “we compare our Perceptions 
together, and observe their Connexion, or Opposition, which is call’d Judging.”399 The process of 
judging, considered by Crousaz, was an act that “when consider as within the mind is called a 
Judgment; but when express, it is a Proposition.”400 According to this definition, through the 
operation of judgement, one was not only able to obtain an innate relationship of perceptions but 
also to express an external verbal record of that judgment. Crousaz explained that judging was the 
process of comparing at least two ideas, and then perceiving the relationship of inclusion or 
exclusion of these ideas, and lastly expressing agreement or disagreement with the perceptions.401 
In other words, according to Crousaz, people compared their perceptions in order to form their 
judgments.  
As to the third step of the operations of human minds, Crousaz mentioned that “in the 
same manner, as we compare our Perceptions in order to form our JUDGEMENTS, we also compare 
our Judgements together, and from thence draw a Conclusion, which is call’d Reasoning.” 402 
Crousaz regarded reasoning as an extension of the act of judgement. If the inclusive or exclusive 
relationship of two perceptions was not clear and perfect enough, Crousaz suggested bringing in a 
third one which is connected with the first two perceptions. Thus, for Crousaz, the principle that 
inserts the third one into the former two was reasoning.403 Reasoning in Crousaz’ theory of logic 
was an act of the combination of judgments into syllogistic or inductive structures.404 As Wilbur 
Samuel Howell concludes, “this part of logical theory in the eighteenth century blended traditional 
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Aristotelian doctrine of syllogism with insights of induction from the philosophy of Francis Bacon, 
Rene Descartes, and John Locke”.405  
For Crousaz, the last step was “By rightly disposing a great Number of Thoughts, Reflections, 
Reasonings, Principles, and Conclusions, we form what is call’d a Discourse; and to succeed the 
better in the right ordering of so many different Parts, a certain Method is necessary.”406 The 
fourth part of eighteenth-century logic kept insisting on right disposition or method as a main 
division of logical theory. Crousaz took the long-held belief that the responsibilities of logicians 
should include both the discovery and communication of knowledge. As Howell mentions, “the 
fourth part of logic as Crousaz framed it emphasizes the presentation of ideas as distinguished from 
the problem of research and discovery”.407 
Other logicians in the eighteenth century also emphasized the functions of logic in the 
discovery and communication of knowledge. In Logick which was one of most famous textbooks 
of logic and well known in academic circles from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
Isaac Watts defined logic as “the art of using our reason well in our enquiries after truth, and the 
communication of it to others.”408 Watts’s Logick had four divisions: (1) perceptions, ideas and 
terms; (2) judgment and propositions; (3) reasoning and syllogism; (4) method. This book embodies 
that the doctrines of eighteenth-century logic included the theories of both enquiry and 
communication. Like Crousaz and Watts, William Duncan followed the tradition of Port-Royalists in 
dividing logic into four parts in The Elements of Logick which was reprinted many times during the 
period of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and was the dominant logical treatise of its 
time. 409  The basic structure of Duncan’s book specifically reveals both the investigative and 
communicative functions of logic. 
 
405 Wilbur Samuel Howell: The Declaration of Independence and Eighteenth-Century Logic, The William and 
Mary Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Oct., 1961), 463-484. 
406 Crousaz (1724), vol. 1, 2-3. 
407 Howell (1971), 325. 
408 Isaac Watts, Logick; or, the Right Use of Reason, in the Enquiry after Truth, (London,1797), 5. 
409 William Duncan divided his The elements of logick (London, 1787) into four books. Book I. Of the Original of our 
Ideas, their various Divisions, and the Manner in which they contribute to the Increase of Knowledge; with a 
Philosophical Account of the Rise, Progress, and Nature of human Language. Book II. Of the Grounds of human 
Judgment, the Doctrine of Propositions, their Use in Reasoning, and Division into self-evident and demonstrable. 
Book III. Of Reasoning and Demonstration, with their Application to the Investigation of Knowledge, and the 
common Affairs of Life. Book IV. Of the Methods of Invention and Science, where the several Degrees of Evidence 
are examined, the Notion of Certainty is fixed and stated, and the Parts of Knowledge in which it may be attained, 
demonstrated at large. Designed particularly for Young Gentlemen at the University, and to prepare the Way to the 
Study of Philosophy and the Mathematicks.  Duncan’s division followed the tradition of the Port-Royalists. 
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A change of the notion of science or knowledge in the seventeenth century brought 
established forms of evidence and principles into doubt, as well as challenging traditional forms of 
method that emphasized demonstrative certainty. Crousaz, Watts and Duncan insisted on the 
traditionally four basic structure of logic: perception and ideas, judgement, reasoning, and method, 
and did not split up the investigative and didactical functions of logic. Human understanding was 
still made up of the power to investigate, comprehend, and communicate knowledge in the 
eighteenth century. That is to say, this period saw significant developments not just in the nature 
of knowledge but also in its exposition. After the appearance of Locke’s Essay, philosophers of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were suspicious of the possibility of certain demonstration, 
gradually lost interest in knowledge achieved by means of syllogism, and free logic from its 
traditional deductive structure.410 Then next section will explain the search of the time for new 
forms of logic and language to replace traditional syllogism and rhetoric. 
 
2. The Dissatisfaction with Syllogism 
In this section, I argue that Paley, following Bacon, Locke and the latitudinarians, had an 
aversion to a syllogistic method of argumentation in his Principles. There was an increasing 
tendency to criticize syllogistic logic that remained strongly associated with the older 
demonstrative form of knowledge in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thus, one of 
significant and striking features of the novelty of probable knowledge consisted in a deep 
dissatisfaction with and a systematic critique of the method of syllogism. Francis Bacon in his New 
Organon (1620) regarded syllogism as a method of analysis rather than investigation: the syllogism 
is “by no means equal to the subtlety of things”, and “compels assent without reference to 
things”.411 And that went along with it was linguistic development for an unbiased relationship 
between words and thoughts. For this purpose, this section explains an attack on syllogism 
developed from the late sixteenth century onward by the examples of Locke and Paley’s 
disapproval of syllogism as a proper way of scientific enquiry and learned communication. 
Philosophers since the late sixteenth-century tried to find a new way of thinking and writing 
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which was suitable for knowledge based on facts and common experience. In the Greek and Roman 
world, academic communication was a field related to the logically certain while rhetoric was about 
the probable. However, Shapiro argues that a dichotomy between logic and rhetoric had gradually 
disappeared since the late sixteenth century. Rhetoric utilized facts and common experience for 
the purposes of emotional appeals and persuasiveness rather than the transfer of knowledge. For 
scholars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, probability was released from the rhetorical 
plausibility and verisimilitude, and entered in the realm of unbiased communication of 
knowledge.412  Thus, although Locke put logic and rhetoric in two places, this section adopts 
Shapiro’s idea of the new blends of logic and rhetoric. In Paley’s day, logic dealt with probability 
that was traditionally the realm of rhetoric.  
The willingness to criticize conventional forms of syllogism could be seen in Locke’s Essay 
and Of the Conduct of the Understanding (1706), which were the most popular and the most 
influentially eighteenth-century English books in learned communities. In these two works, Locke 
mainly tried to solve the problem that how knowledge was to be sought, understood and 
transmitted.413 In other words, the question was what should a man do to obtain valid knowledge. 
In order to deal with this question, Locke gave two criteria of evaluation, that is the accurate 
correspondence between human ideas and the realities, and the accurate correspondence 
between human ideas and their words.414 Following these two standards, Locke presented two 
rules: right reasoning and perspicuity. For Locke, through these two rules, people could obtain the 
most probable level of knowledge about the realities of his environment.   
The first one of Locke’s two rules is right reasoning.415 In the Essay, Locke showed his 
aversion to syllogism because of his emphasis on scientific enquiry. Firstly, Locke was dubious about 
the syllogistic procedure of logic mainly because it acquired knowledge not from facts and 
experience but from maxims.416 This procedure began with the citation of assumed and well-
known maxims, and was followed with the reference for demonstrating a relevant but not so 
familiar statement.417 Thinkers who accepted this procedure thought highly of maxims and looked 
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down on evidence from facts and experience which were regarded as lower objects.418 However, 
Locke held that “the immediate object of all our reasoning and knowledge, is nothing but 
particulars”.419 For him, particulars were the proper objects of scientific discovery of knowledge 
although they were less self-evident. Therefore, Locke’s new logic placed particulars above 
traditional maxims and made an attack upon acceptedly syllogistic logic without doubt because of 
the latter one was of less use in acquiring particulars. 
Secondly, Locke proceeded to consider whether syllogism was the proper instrument of right 
reasoning. For him, syllogism was of less use in the establishment of knowledge. Locke argued that 
the judgement of a proposition must need a comprehensive consideration of all the evidence and 
situations, however, syllogism examined only one assumed maxim so deeply as to lose sight of 
others. 420  For him, all circumstances had to be considered in order to achieve “the greater 
probability”.421 Moreover, Locke held that syllogism was a more suitable method of disputation 
rather than of the exposition of knowledge. He argued that a person was easily persuaded by a 
chain of formal syllogisms but not truly convinced by them.422 Upon the whole, Locke’s disapproval 
of syllogistic logic was due to its less value in the direction of reasoning and in the use of exposition. 
Paley agreed on Locke’s opposition of syllogism. Locke’s one letter on July 2nd, 1696 shows 
that his Essay started to get some credit in the development of logical education at Cambridge.423 
Harrison holds that Paley’s Natural Theology which is expanded by the chapter “Divine 
Benevolence” in the Principles is typically regarded as inductive argument.424 In Natural Theology, 
Paley brought about the way by which he drew together a common pattern from particulars: 
Now it is by frequent or continued meditation upon a subject, by placing a subject in different 
points of view, by induction of particulars, by variety of examples, by applying principles to the 
solution of phenomena, by dwelling upon proofs and consequences, that mental exercise is 
drawn into any particular channel. It is by these means at least, that we have power over it. 
The train of spontaneous thought, and the choice of that train, may be directed to different 
ends, and may appear to be more or less judiciously fixed, according to the purpose, in respect 
of which we consider it: but, in a moral view, I shall not, I believe, be contracted when I say, 
that, if one train of thinking be more desirable than another, it is that which regards the 
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phenomena of nature with a reference to a supreme intelligent Author.425 
The proper inductive procedure ruled out metaphysical arguments and widely-accepted axioms 
and admitted only facts ascertained by experience and investigation. Therefore, Paley’s natural 
theology was nothing more than an inductive science which was based on generalizations drawn 
from a large number of particular facts.  
In the Principles, Paley also confessed his worry about the deficiency of the arrangement of 
arguments in his period. In the dedication of the book, Paley argued that a reasoning method with 
deductive arguments was not suitable for ordinary readers, in particular young students. These 
students not merely wanted axioms but also needed several evidence and explanations to set up 
their thoughts about the meaning and truth of moral assertions. 426  Paley was averse to the 
technique of stringing moral propositions together without subjoining a continued argument in his 
period.427 Instead, Paley suggested his students “tarry at every proposition, till they have traced 
out its dependency, proof, relation, and consequences, before they permit themselves to step on 
to another”.428 This statement is very like what Locke said about the judgement of a proposition 
depended upon considering all the evidence, and is very similar to the way of reasoning that Paley 
applied in Natural Theology.  
This view that the syllogistic form of argumentation was out of date was a corollary of an 
increasing emphasis on experiential and testimonial evidence. Paley belonged to the tradition that 
eighteenth-century logic placed particular things above traditional general maxims. He viewed 
morality primarily as an actual working force in life and paid close attention to deal with real 
problems in ordinary life.429 Similarly with his natural theology, for Paley, the business of moral 
philosophy was an ongoing investigation of the particulars of everyday life. Every single particular 
instance was in itself a complete argument, and all such arguments had a more powerful effect 
than a single one. 430  In order words, Paley’s arguments were cumulative. He shared the 
eighteenth-century traditional aversion to syllogism in the Principles. 
This technique of stringing evidence from experience could be applied into testimonial 
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evidence. Paley’s moral philosophy was also an inductive science consisting of generalizations 
drawn from the particular instances of Scripture. The idea of natural theology as an inductive 
science called for a desire to bring an inductive reasoning into the understanding of Scripture. 
According to this, Scripture itself was thought to be a system of knowledge supported by particular 
instances. As Harrison holds, Paley regarded religion as simply another subject of human 
reasoning. 431  In other words, the readers of Scripture became the virtual witnesses of the 
particular instances under different historical circumstances.432 Paley’s use of Scripture as the 
textbook of his moral philosophy embodied that he recommended the young minds to turn to 
Scripture and find examples how God dealt with men under similar circumstances in other days. 
Paley was opposed to applying the method of syllogism to both natural and revealed religion. 
Paley used a synthetic method to explain at length moral obligation and duties which were 
integral parts of the entirety of his moral philosophy. Then he proceeded to divide duties into three 
different types: relative duties (determinate and indeterminate), duties to ourselves, and duties 
towards God. As for these topics, Paley used particular instances from Scripture and his daily 
experience to respond to all the possible situations, which was already explained in the chapter 
“Evidence”, as well as the examples of British, the European continent, America, Africa and even 
China which Paley did not give the origins of them.433 In short, Paley followed inductive steps in 
the Principles.  
The other of two rules Locke presented is perspicuity, which is related to the 
correspondence between human ideas and their words.434 Locke eagerly put forward an art of 
impartial exposition to deal with the problem of learned communication. John Wynne, the 
complier of Locke’s Essay, dedicated that the Essay concerned with the easy and plain transmission 
of knowledge. 435  And in The Conduct of the Understanding, Locke stuck to understanding 
everything just as it is in itself.436 In order to do this, Locke held that “besides Order and Clearness, 
all the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else, 
but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgement; and so 
 
431 Harrison (2015), 155. 
432 R. W. Serjeantson’s “Proof and Persuasion”, in The Cambridge History of Science, vol. 3 (2006), 157. 
433 Paley (2002), 8, 11, 18, 60-61, 64-67, 71, 87, 106, 119, 136. 
434 John Locke (1836), 348-352. 
435 Howell (1971), 271. 
436 Howell (1971), 277. 
75 
 
indeed are perfect cheat”.437 For Locke, the imperfection and abuse of language were twofold: a 
vague and slow process of transmission by language, and a distorted or even false view of 
language’s subject.438 According to Locke, language was abused or deficient if it failed in any of 
these. 
Locke held that academic discourses should follow the rules of a plain style. First, it was 
necessary to “take care to use no words without a signification, no names without an idea for which 
he makes it stand”.439 Second was to make sure words annexed to simple ideas to “be clear and 
distinct”, and those annexed to complex ideas to “be determinate”.440  Third, the names and 
definitions of things must agree with “the truth of things”.441 Only by adhering to these rules could 
academic audience acquire knowledge concisely. 
Locke’s idea not only inherited the predecessors, but also pervaded among the 
contemporaries. The first major effort to establish an appropriate mode of communication and 
presentation was made by Francis Bacon. He stated that “for all that concerns ornaments of speech 
similitudes, treasury of eloquence, and such like emptinesses, let it be utterly dismissed. Also let 
all those things which are admitted be themselves set down briefly and concisely, so that they may 
be nothing less than words”.442 Thomas Sprat, on behalf of the Royal Society, claimed that “In all 
Reports to be brought into the Society, the Matter of Fact shall be barely stated, without any 
Prefaces, Apologies, or Rhetorical Flourishes.”443 For him, language must “bring Knowledge back 
again to our very senses from whence it was first derived to our understanding.”444 The plain 
language expression and literature forms were suitable for scientific discourses. 
In terms of the style of writing, Paley preferred a plain way with order and clearness as well. 
He confessed his life-long interest in both discovery and communication of moral philosophy in the 
letter to Edmund Law, the lord Bishop of Carlisle.445 Paley thought highly of the skill and clearness 
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of Locke’s argumentation.446 Paley found that the manner of writing in the current treatises was 
overloaded with the quotations from classics, “if these extracts be intended as decorations of 
style”.447 For Paley this bewildering style of writing contributed to nothing but the distraction of 
readers’ attention. He argued that “to propose them as serious arguments, gravely to attempt to 
establish or fortify a moral duty by the testimony of a Greek or Roman poet, is to trifle with the 
attention of the reader, or rather to take it off from all just principles of reasoning in morals”.448 In 
the preface of the Principles, Paley reiterated that he tried to “inform his readers distinctly ad 
specifically”. 449  In the views of that time, language was deficient when it failed to convey 
knowledge from one to others easily, quickly, clearly and accurately. 
Locke also emphasized attention to civil life. He suggested that: 
we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness; all the artificial and 
figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate 
wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgement; as so indeed are perfect 
cheats; and therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues 
and popular addresses, they are certainly in all discourses, that pretend to inform or instruct, 
wholly to be avoided.450 
In addition to improper use of rhetoric, Paley held that these imperfections of moral philosophy in 
his time also included indistinct explanation and inadequate rules that were not sufficiently 
adapted to real life and to actual situations.451 Echoing Locke, Paley suggested that the expression 
of moral philosophy should be more quotidized. 
The response to changes in rhetorical and logical theory was also involved in the realm of 
theology. The attitude of the latitudinarians towards the theories of probable knowledge and 
evidence, which has been discussed in earlier chapters, resulted in their rejection of a fanatical 
theology and the favor of a peaceful and reasonable religion which emphasized a virtuous life. 
However, they were apologists against atheists as well. They combined positions as apologists and 
intellectuals led them to reject confusingly allegorical interpretation of Scripture. Instead, they 
pursed the simplicity, plainness and charity of scriptural texts with a touch of religious affections.452 
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For example, John Tillotson objected to the unordered enthusiasm and syllogistic approach of 
theology. He insisted on the elimination of “sublime notions and unintelligible mysteries, with 
pleasant passages of wit, and artificial strains of rhetoric; and nice and unprofitable disputes, with 
bold interpretations of dark prophesies”.453 Obviously, Paley was concerned with the simple and 
clear interpretation of scriptural texts and theological argumentation. He considered Scripture as 
a textbook of teaching the science of morality, and highly recommended the teaching method in 
Scripture: general rules were followed by fictitious examples or instances which actually presented 
themselves, or the resolution of questions.454 Through the efforts of the latitudinarians, a plain 
style of theology became mainstream in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
Paley might have disagreed with Locke’s view on the function of communication of 
eighteenth-century logic. As mentioned in the last section, eighteenth-century logic still included 
both functions of the discovery and transfer of knowledge. However, Locke intended to only focus 
on the function of scientific enquiry and tried to separate his new logic from the traditional learned 
communication. As Howell mentioned, Locke’s two books embodies his preference for dissociating 
his logic from the function of transmitting ideas.455 Locke’s distaste for syllogism that was a more 
proper method of victory in disputation also reflects his efforts to free the function of the search 
for knowledge from the function of the communication of it. Locke always clearly insisted on the 
difference between the method of discovering knowledge and the method of transferring it, that 
is to say, “between the method of raising any science and that of teaching it to others”.456 
This did not mean that Locke ignored the importance of the communicative function, 
however, he just put it into the realm of new rhetoric. Locke always kept in mind that the method 
of discovering knowledge and the method of transmitting it should not be confused with each 
other.457 But Howell argues that the influence of Locke’s theory of new logic and rhetoric was a 
gradual process and fully emerged until the late eighteenth century. 458  Thus, Paley still was 
influenced by the traditional eighteenth-century view of logic. For him, logic included 
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communicative function. By putting forward Locke’s two rules of right reasoning and perspicuity 
firstly, I showed that Paley, following the fashion of the time, disapproved a syllogistic method of 
argumentation. Paley agreed with Locke because his moral philosophy was based on the particular 
instances from Scripture and experience, and because he accepted a plain writing style and 
disparaged redundant quotations from ancient materials. Therefore, Paley’s Principles embodies 
his disapproval of syllogism. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, change in the conceptions of knowledge, 
evidence and probable theory encouraged a vehement and sustained attack on the value of 
conventional syllogistic logic for teaching knowledge and brought about a new standard of plain, 
unadorned language for science and Scripture. The next section will discuss that a group of 
philosophers like George Campbell identified their mission to find a more adequate method for 
pedagogical purposes.  
 
3. Two methods of argumentation of the eighteenth-century logic: analysis and synthesis 
In this section, I argue that analysis and synthesis were thought of as two main methods of 
argumentation in learned communities. The discipline of traditional arrangement of discourses 
consisted of six major parts: the exordium, the narration, the division, the proof, the refutation, 
and the conclusion.459 This oratorical structure had pervaded from the classical Roman era to the 
seventeenth century. These six terms, however, no longer had a dominant place in the theories of 
eighteenth-century logic in England. Instead, George Campbell, Joseph Priestley, and Hugh Blair 
highly praised analytic and synthetic methods of new logic, which gradually had a strong influence 
upon the arrangement of discourses. As Shapiro mentions, the development of the theories of 
knowledge and evidence of the time blurred the dichotomy between rhetoric and logic, and raised 
a growing interest of pedagogy and academic communication.460 
Campbell who had a prestigious reputation in the field of new logic in his time, in The 
Philosophy of Rhetoric, only discussed analytic and synthetic methods for the theory of 
argumentative forms instead of the traditional six parts of the classical oration. He stated that “In 
 
459 For more on the definition and development of these categories, see Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 
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moral reasoning we proceed by analysis, and ascend from particulars to universals; in syllogizing 
we proceed by synthesis, and descend from universals to particulars.”461 The analytic method, 
Campbell explained, was the method of the discovery of knowledge not previously known, of “the 
acquisition of natural knowledge, or of whatever regards actual existences”; the synthetic method, 
however, was the proper method of the application of knowledge already acquired. 462  He 
summarized that “it is for this reason it [the synthetic] has been called the didactic method, as 
being the shortest way of communicating the principles of a science”.463 With respect to the 
methods by which arguments are put together, Campbell associated rhetoric with logic together 
and analyzed the investigative function of the analytic and the communicative function of the 
synthetic. 
In the same way, Priestley, in his A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism which 
showed how to teach logic and rhetoric in English education during the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, paid close attention to the analytic and the synthetic. He emphasized on 
logical methods with the procedures of analysis and synthesis. “Logicians speak of two kinds of 
method in argumentative discourses, the analytic and the synthetic.”464 Priestley explained that 
analysis proceeded from particular observations to more general conclusions; in contrast, synthesis 
began with more general and comprehensive propositions and then descended to particular 
propositions.465 Priestley went on to account for the different functions of these two methods. “In 
the former method [analysis] we are obliged to proceed in our investigation of truth: […]. In the 
latter method [synthesis] it is generally more convenient to explain a system of science to 
others”. 466  For him, analysis was an essential method of investigation while synthesis was a 
fundamental method of communication and explanation. When Priestley spoke of the theory of 
logical argumentative arrangement, he approved of analysis and synthesis.  
Blair, the last great British rhetorician of the eighteenth century, in his Lectures on Rhetoric 
and Belles Lettres which was one of the most popular and most influential treatises of new logic 
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and rhetoric of its age, treated the theory of disposition as the traditional parts of the classical 
oration. Blair said that “two different methods may be used by Orators in the conduct of their 
reasoning; the terms of art for which are, the Analytic, and the Synthetic method.”467 Blair’s 
explanation of the analytic and the synthetic was similar to contemporary logicians. Blair stated 
that, analysis planned to conceal the point which needed to be proved while synthesis aimed to 
lay down the point to be proved and make related examples to support it until the audiences were 
fully convinced.468 Blair belonged to the tradition of his period to regard synthesis as a more 
suitable method to public speaking than the analytic one. 
According to all explanations of these most famous eighteenth-century logicians, analysis 
and synthesis were the main logical methods of argumentation in the time. The analytic method 
consisted in going from observed facts to a general conclusion or theory. It allowed speakers to 
hide their intentions before their readers were fully convinced, which reflects its function of 
investigation and discovery. The reverse of analysis was synthesis, proceeding from general 
theories or principles to particular instances or facts. It firstly put forward argument points, and 
then convinced hearers with reasonable evidence and related examples, which reflects its function 
of the instruction, exposition and communication of knowledge already known. As Howell explains, 
eighteenth-century teachers applied the synthetic method to impart knowledge to students.469  
Overall, a group of eighteenth-century logicians devoted intensive efforts to trying to 
establish a synthetic method as a new form of scientific and academic communication. This new 
approach revealed their concern for accurate reporting of observed evidence and particulars of 
Scripture and common experience. A shift in language contributed to the emergence of a literary 
form of textbook. The next section will explain that Paley’s Principles, as a textbook, adopts a 
synthetic method of logic for the purpose of teaching. 
 
4. The Didactical function of synthesis in Paley’s moral philosophy 
In this section, I argue that Paley’s Principles adopts synthesis as the method of the 
arrangement of discourse. The new theories of knowledge, evidence and language raised the 
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status of synthesis and brought about a revised attitude towards literature forms.470 As Watts 
mentioned, logic was “not only to assist us in learning, but in teaching also”, and “we should be 
furnished with some particular directions relating to the definition of names, both in teaching and 
learning”. 471  Paley’s Principles reflects a eighteenth-century concern for classification and 
systematic communication in academic circles. 
The emergence of textbooks as a new literary form revealed a growing interest in 
disciplinary communication in the eighteenth century. As R. W. Serjeantson mentions, the 
development of disciplinary subjects was an important stimulus to the decline of the expository 
and commentary mode of authoritative texts, and to the production of new syntheses.472 Paley 
adopted the plan which he had used in his Cambridge lectures and enlarged it to the present form 
of the Principles. Paley mentioned that the method of teaching all practical sciences was that 
“[r]ules are laid down and examples are subjoined”.473  The replacement of the commentary 
tradition by textbook was related to changing conceptions of logic. The Principles, in the literary 
form of textbook, demonstrates Paley’s effort to arrange disciplinary moral knowledge in a 
systematically synthetic manner. 
At the micro level of the Principles, Paley stuck to a synthetic writing technique. For example, 
when discussing the topic of virtue, Paley uncovered his steps of writing that he placed the 
definition of virtue at the beginning of the chapter.474 Paley defined moral virtue as “the doing 
good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness.”475 
He collected evidence from both the particulars from experience and Scripture to answer the 
question how a human could perform a virtuous act without having either the good of mankind, 
the will of God, or everlasting happiness in his thought.476 On the one hand, Paley gave an example 
of a servant to illustrate that a good servant who was not always aware of his master’s will, interest 
and consciousness could do a good job because he had served for and lived with the awareness of 
his master’s motives for a long time.477 On the other hand, Paley had recourse to the authority of 
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Scripture. Based on these examples, Paley came to the conclusion that “Man is a bundle of 
habits”.478 Paley, therefore, acknowledged that human acted from the effect and energy of pre-
established habits by the means of synthesis. 
There are other plain and simple examples of a synthetic teaching plan in the Principles. in 
the chapter “Partnership”, Paley listed the general rules of partnership at first and then gave a 
variety of examples at the next paragraph.479  This synthetic type of composing helped Paley 
present moral knowledge very clearly and directly. When explaining the general rule of expediency, 
Paley subjoined a serious of examples and explained the particular and general consequences of 
coining, forgery, sheep or horse-stealing, breaking, and smuggling in order to “impress this doctrine 
on the minds of young readers”.480 Paley explained perfect and imperfect rights followed with a 
bunch of examples in like manner.481 The Principles reveals Paley’s synthetic pedagogics which will 
be discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs by an example of the chapter “The Divine 
Benevolence”. 
The divine benevolence was the fundamental element of Paley’s entire ethical system and 
a typical example of how Paley used a synthetic method of logic. Paley firstly pointed out the 
general rule: God is benevolent. When God created human beings, three probabilities might 
constitute his intention: God desired human happiness, or he desired their misery, or he was 
indifferent to both. The fact that God did not desire the misery of human race was demonstrated 
by the constitution of human senses which bring them more delight than pain. If God wished the 
race misery, “he might have made […] every thing we tasted, bitter; every thing we saw, loathsome; 
every thing we touched, a sting; every smell a stench; and every sound a discord.”482 If God was 
not concerned about either happiness or misery of human, people must attribute to a very 
fortunate accident that their senses were able to receive pleasure and that so many external 
objects were capable of exciting it.483 Inasmuch as human happiness should not be the product of 
an accident, Paley concluded that when God created human, desired their happiness.  
In the second step of his synthetic method, Paley picked up the discoveries of anatomists 
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as evidence to show that none of the system of organizations calculated to produce pain and 
disease. In his view, “the world abounds with contrivances: and all the contrivances which we are 
acquainted with, are directed to beneficial purposes. Evil, no doubt, exists; but is never, that we 
can perceive, the object of contrivance.”484 In Paley’s text, teeth are designed not to ache but to 
eat. Aching is incidental to the contrivance, although it is perhaps inseparable from it. Aching can 
be called a defect of the design of teeth, but it is not the object of it.485  
In a different example, Paley also found the evidence of the divine benevolence from his 
personal experience. He held that the benignity of the Deity was more manifestly demonstrated in 
the pleasures of very young children than in anything else, since the pleasures of adulthood might 
be considered as the product of the environment in which they lived. After taking the joys of 
children as another clear example of the divine benevolence, Paley again concluded that God must 
desire and ordain the happiness of his creatures.486  
Overall, I used a few chapters of the Principles, especially the chapter on divine 
benevolence, to discuss the pedagogical purpose that Paley drew by synthesis. For the purpose of 
exciting young minds, Paley used synthetic method, putting forward the points to be proved and 
then supporting evidence and examples, until he thought that his readers were fully convinced. 
Thus, the Principles vividly embodies the teaching of a systematic body of knowledge by a synthetic 
method in the eighteenth century.   
 
Conclusion 
It was the purpose of this chapter to explain synthetic logic in Paley’s the Principles. The 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw a radical revaluation of probable knowledge. This 
change was not only limited in the nature of knowledge, but extended to the field of the methods 
by which scholars could communicate knowledge to others. Therefore, the eighteenth-century 
theories of logic did not reserve for the demonstrative, but opened the door for the probable. The 
shift in philosophical interest from metaphysics to epistemology also led to an urgent concern for 
literary forms which were suitable for the impartial and unbiased transfer of knowledge based on 
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facts and common experience. Paley’s logic was very close to the common tradition of his day. 
Since the business of logic included both the discovery and exposition of knowledge, Paley focused 
on the Principles as a disciplinary textbook of morality, and aimed to teach students moral 
knowledge by a synthetic method in this book. 
In order to achieve this aim, Paley shared Locke’s rule of righting reasoning and was averse 
to syllogism. Paley had an aversion to a fashion of his time of stringing propositions together 
without following examples and explanations. Instead, he gave students a mass of relevant 
discussions and examples to vivify his moral assents. The general principles in his Principles were 
grounded on the particular instances from Scripture and experience, which was already discussed 
in the chapter “Evidence”. Following Locke’s rule of perspicuity, Paley also had an aversion to 
superabundant citations of classical materials. In other words, Paley insisted on a plain utterance 
in the Principles. This reveals that the function of communication was the impartial transmission 
of knowledge in Paley’s time.  
The most innovative part of this chapter was that Paley praised highly a synthetic method 
of teaching moral philosophy. As is known to all, the Principles was a textbook in the subject of 
ethics at Cambridge university, however, few people have thought about the way by which Paley 
achieved his teaching aim. Thus, this chapter explained in detail that Paley accepted a perspicuous 
writing style and a synthetic method of argumentation to work together for moral education in the 
Principles. This book proves Howell’s view that eighteenth-century logic was still influenced by the 
previous tradition to include both functions of discovery and communication of knowledge. The 





Conclusion of Thesis 
 
This thesis addressed several aspects of eighteenth-century moral science by the example 
of William Paley’s The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. The theme of this thesis has 
been an intellectual revolution of the conception of knowledge, and the erosion of the traditional 
dichotomy between “science” and probability”. The Latin term scientia precisely was only reserved 
for the province of demonstrative certainty. However, in the course of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the revival of skepticism cast the traditional division of knowledge and 
opinion, certainty and probability, logic and rhetoric into doubt. At the end of the seventeenth 
century, the task of thinkers changed from absolute truths to probable knowledge. Undoubtedly, 
this paradigm shift played an important role in shaping English intellectual life in the middle of the 
eighteenth century. On the basis of the fundamental framework provided by Barbara J. Shapiro’s 
Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England, this thesis averred that Paley’s works 
manifests an acute consciousness of the implications of the new notion of knowledge to replace 
the older conception of “science”.  
The changing conception of knowledge had a ripple effect on early modern notions of 
evidence. Chapter 2 dealt with evidence and probability, or the degrees of certainty. This topic 
revealed the tension between skepticism and dogmatism, as well as between the certainty of 
sense-based data and the fallibility and limitation of human senses. In theology, the latitudinarians’ 
view of natural religion as experiential observations, and their treatment of Scripture as historical 
and testimonial evidence played a significant role in the formation of Paley’s thought of evidence. 
They were interested in both the Book of Nature and the Book of Scripture, and took efforts to 
establish a rational basis for a rational religion and morality. As to natural theology, evidence from 
observation and experience was evaluated to have certain reliability. With regard to revealed 
religion, Scripture was thought of as a written account of what actually happened in history.  
In common with the tradition of eighteenth-century England, Paley treated both natural 
and revealed religion as the sources of the will of God. It was necessary for a reasonable person to 
obtain a rational interpretation of Scripture and nature. Paley’s Evidences and Natural Theology 
made celebrated contributions to the supplement of evidence of religious impressions and 
apologetics of the divine benevolence. Paley’s Principles was a product of a mutual cooperation of 
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reason and evidence, which was based on evidence from Scripture and experience. Like many 
seventeenth and eighteenth-century English intellectuals, Paley focused on grading evidence, and 
devoting himself to offering the scales of reliability beyond reasonable doubt to his moral 
philosophy. 
Starting with rational evidence, Paley finally arrived at his destination of the general rule of 
expediency. Paley’s moral philosophy could be seen as a remedy for the inadequacies of all moral 
codes of behaviour in his day. As Niall O’Flaherty concludes, “the doctrine of utility that Paley 
inherited comprised three essential elements: the Lockean account of moral sensibility, the 
utilitarian criterion of morals and the resting of moral obligation in divine sanctions”.487 Paley’s 
engagement with each of three topics was examined in Chapter 3. On the one hand, accepting the 
framework of the principles of happiness and expediency laid by John Gay, Edmund Law and 
Abraham Tucker, Paley developed utility into a more widely-applied guide than any other moral 
codes in his day. On the other hand, Paley figured out the problem of the lack of sufficiently forceful 
charitable impetuses by building the science of ethics on a theological foundation. As O’Flaherty 
mentions, “a chief aim of Anglican utilitarians from Law onwards was to adjust man’s religious (not 
to mention social and political) expectations to suit the ‘frailty’ of his nature as increasingly 
revealed by the science of morals”.488 
In the course of establishing such principles, Paley encountered many crucial issues, such 
as the fallibility of human senses, which threatened empirical observation, and the fallibility of the 
understanding, which was social and cultural bias. Paley deliberated on the nature of human 
happiness under the microscope and focused on the practical task of the cultivation and 
management of customary habits. In the meantime, Paley met with the challenge of forming 
general principles of behaviour based on the calculations of individual happiness. He raised 
Lockean account of moral sensibility into line with the practical principle of expediency, combining 
with eternal sanctions from religion. Paley partially resolved the issues of customary bias and the 
limitation of human inquiry by a mixture of customary habits, the principle of expediency, and 
religious sanctions, which mutually compensated for each other. It was the chief concern of Paley’s 
Principles to find a practical method by which people might know their moral duty.  
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The high probable level of knowledge arose the need of a fresh method by which moralists 
were able to effectively inculcate moral knowledge, therefore, Chapter 4 of this thesis concerned 
with the epistemological and methodological problems that came with the new form of knowledge. 
As mentioned above, knowledge and probability were closely overlapping in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, it is not surprising that some methods that used to belong to opinion or 
probability were applied to science or knowledge. O’Flaherty mentions that Paley’s Principles was 
not merely a synthesis of an earlier tradition.489 However, O’Flaherty’s explanation mainly focuses 
on “how theological utilitarianism was regarded by Paley and his predecessors as an engine of such 
advancement”, and does not expand on the topic of synthesis in Paley’s Principles.490 Chapter 4 
filled in the topic of synthetic pedagogic method in Paley’s moral philosophy, which conformed to 
the historical trend of probable knowledge. When moral knowledge drawn from evidence from 
experience and Scripture was thought to lie somewhere between the demonstrable truth and 
mere opinion, it was necessary for Paley and his contemporaries to find a way which was more 
appropriate for the highly probable form of knowledge than syllogism.  
The construction of the probable knowledge since the late sixteenth century brought an 
intellectual movement into a number of fields that look different nowadays but used to be 
overlapping, just like natural philosophy, theology, morality and logic that I have discussed in this 
thesis. Even though Paley has been thought of as a prominent theologist, moralist and natural 
philosopher separately for a long time, a comprehensive and systematic discussion about his moral 
philosophy from the perspective of the early modern conception of science or knowledge has 
received little attention from historians. It should have not been so because Paley had the immense 
popularity and considerable success enjoyed by the Principles and his other works during the 
period of the eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries. Such omissions may be due to Paley’s 
profound influence on natural theology, Christian theology and utilitarian theory respectively, and 
each of them is worth discussing at length.  
However, a striking feature of English intellectual life from the end of the seventeenth 
century was the inability of absolute truths and the satisfaction with highly probable knowledge 
under the theme of a unified system of knowledge. Ethical debates as a part and even main care 
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of religion had a crucial implication that Paley’s theories of natural theology, Christian theology and 
utilitarianism should be placed under one frame. Just as Peter Harrison explains, the common 
context in the eighteenth century was a mixture, consistency and harmony of theological, ethical 
and natural philosophical knowledge.491 In regard to this situation, this thesis put such theories 
under the frame of united knowledge to expound Paley’s gift at weaving and utilizing information 
taken from morality, theology and natural philosophy by a synthetic method to establish a divinely 
imposed moral principle, expediency. This thesis probably would be beneficial for the researches 
of eighteenth-century moral philosophy on a smaller level, and for the understanding of a different 
interpretation of science before the mid-nineteenth century on a larger scale, which is very strange 
to the modern who has already accepted and regarded science as a specialized and professional 
term for a long time. In the end, Paley’s Principles reveals the courage of eighteenth-century English 
intellectuals to face the imperfections of human understanding, and their efforts to seek a kind of 
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